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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Use of Fee Simple Determinable to Enforce Racial Restrictive Provisions
In Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer,' the
North Carolina Supreme Court recently held that land deeded in fee
simple determinable would revert to the grantor if certain racial restrictions were not complied with, without violating the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 This holding deserves
close scrutiny by layman and lawyer.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 3 This applies to any agency whereby
the state exercises its powers, whether legislative, administrative, or
judicial. 4 Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the courts
have applied the Equal Protection Clause to determine the legality
of state action in a number of racial segregation cases. Thus, provisions for racial segregation in municipal housing ordinances, 5 statutes
denying Negroes the right to vote in primary elections, 6 statutes discriminating against Negroes in the selection of jurors, 7 and the refusal
by a board of trustees of a library supplied with state funds to admit
a Negress to a library training course s were held to be unwarranted
extensions of state power and, therefore, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Court action, as violative state action, formed the basis for the
Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer.9 Several property
owners in St. Louis sought to enjoin a Negro purchaser of real estate
encumbered with a racial restrictive covenant from moving into their
242 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. 2d 114 (1955).
U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
-

' Ibid.
'Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1880); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339
(1880).
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S.
704 (1930). State courts have held similar ordinances invalid: Glover v. Atlanta,
148 Ga. 285, 96 S. E. 562 (1918); Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 103 Atl. 910
(1918) ; Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 217 N. C. 119, 65 S. E. 2d 867 (1940) ; Allen
v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 42, 52 P. 2d 1054 (1936); Liberty Annex Corp. v.
Dallas, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 289 S. W. 1067 (1927); Irvine v. Clifton Forge,
124 Va. 781, 97 S. E. 310 (1918).
'Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927).
" Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879).
'Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F. 2d 212 (4th
Cir. 1945).
1-334 U. S. 1 (1948).
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residential district. The residents had previously signed an agreement
mutually promising to restrict the use and occupancy of their land to
Caucasians. The lower court granted the injunction.' 0 The Supreme
Court, however, held that the injunction granted by the Missouri court
was such state action as contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment
to constitute a denial of equal protection to members of the excluded
race." Without the state court's action, the restrictive covenant could
not have been enforced. The Supreme Court recognized that while the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state action, it did not reach private
agreements, however discriminatory. Their "enforcement," however,
was limited to voluntary adherence to the covenant by the contracting
parties.'

2

Following this decision, the Supreme Court carried the "state action"
concept one step further in a damage suit brought by one co13
covenantor against another for breach of a racial restrictive covenant.
4
The Supreme Court, basing its decision on the Shelley case,' held
that, although the covenant was valid, and no constitutional rights had
been violated, a judgment awarding damages would be prohibited by
the Amendment. 15
Since the above decisions dealt primarily with attempted court enforcement of racial restrictive provisions in deeds conveying land, the
Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S. W. 2d 679 (1946).
" See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 (1948), announcing the same rule
for the District of Columbia. Prior to this decision the courts consistently enforced racial restrictive covenants. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323 (1926);
Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217 (1918) ; Burkhardt v. Lofton,
63 Cal. App. 2d 230, 146 P. 2d 720 (1944). For North Carolina decisions see
Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710 (1946)
(validity of covenants conceded); Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E.
496 (1930) (damages awarded).
12 Following the Shelley decision, four actions seeking damages for breach of
covenant were brought in state courts. Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W.
2d 127 (1949) and Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P. 2d 1017 (1951)
limited the Shelley rule to remedy by injunction, but Robert v. Curtis, 93 F.
Supp. 604 (D. C. D. C. 1950) and Phillips v. Naff, 332 Mich. 389, 52 N. W. 2d
158 (1952) interpreted Shelley v. Kraemer to hold that enforcement of covenants
in judicial proceedings was unconstitutional whether action was brought at law
or in
equity.
"3 Jackson v. Barrows, 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
1 "The [Shelley] decision sounds the death knell for all racial restrictive
covenants and related superficially legal schemes as effective weapons in enforcing racial discrimination." Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate-Property
Values v. Hitman Values, 24 NoTRE DAMFE LAW. 157, 190 (1948).
1" In a similar action, the Texas court rejected an attempt to indirectly enforce
a racial restrictive covenant. Clifton v. Puente, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 218 S. W
2d 272 (1948). There, the purchaser, a Mexican, brought an action in ejectment
against a prior grantee who defended his refusal to vacate on the ground that
the deed under which the Mexican claimed contained a restrictive covenant providing for forfeiture upon sale to Mexicans. The court held that to allow this
defense would in effect constitute a judicial determination that the terms of the
racial restrictive covenant be carried out and thus be violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
10
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reported North Carolina decision is of particular importance. In this
case, the grantor deeded land to the City of Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission to be used as a public recreation park, but limited his
gift with the requirement that:
"....

[I] n the event that the said land ... shall not be kept, used

and maintained for park, playground, and/or recreational purposes, for use by the white race only, and if such disuse or nonmaintenance continue for any period as long as one year ...
then ... the lands hereby conveyed shall revert in fee simple to
the [grantor]. . . ." (Emphasis added.)' 0

The court held that if Negroes should use the land, "the determinable
fee 17 . . .automatically will cease and terminate by its own limitation

expressed in the deed, and the estate granted automatically will revert
[to the grantor], by virtue of the limitation in the deed .... The opera-

tion of this reversion provision is not by any judicial enforcement by
the State Courts of North Carolina, and Shelley v. Kraemer has no
application."' 8
The court noted that the racial restrictive provision was included
as a part of the original limitation of a grant in fee simple determinable.
Since this device is seldom used, it may deserve closer examination. An
18242 N. C. at 313, 88 S. E. 2d at 117.
1 The court held that the grantor conveyed a "fee determinable upon special
limitations." 242 N. C. at 321, 88 S. E. 2d at 122. The writer believes that this
is the first North Carolina case which makes this determination in connection
with a full fee interest in the land itself. Prior cases were decided on the basis
of a determinable life estate or determinable easements.
For a collection of state court decisions which have recognized the validity
of determinable fees, see 1 SIMaEs, FuTuRa INTERESTS § 178 n. 10 (1936).
18 242 N. C. at 322, 88 S. E. 2d at 123.
For the purpose of this Note, the author will proceed on the assumption that
the court properly construed the grant to have been in fee simple determinable.
However, some observations must be made in this respect.

The deed provided that ".

.

. as a condition precedent to the reversion of the

said lands in any such event, the [grantor] shall pay unto the [grantee] .. . the
sum of thirty-five hundred dollars ($3500)." (Emphasis added.) 242 N. C. at 313,
88 S. E. 2d at 117. This condition seems to have been disregarded by both
counsel and court. It raises the question whether the reversion provision might
actually operate automatically upon termination of the estate through use by
Negroes of the recreation park. Assuming that the grantor has a possibility of
reverter until the estate is determined, the provision in the deed requires an affirmative act on his part to re-vest the title in him. Professor Simes believes that
the event upon which a possibility of reverter is to vest in possession cannot be
at the exercise of an option by the grantor. 1 SInEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 180
(1936). The effect of the provision for payment contained in the deed would be
difficult to distinguish from a power of termination upon breach of condition
subsequent.
Also, the North Carolina court has consistently held that conditions subsequent
which result in the forfeiture of an estate will be strictly construed aqainst the
grantor. Unless the court finds clear and express words of re-entry or forfeiture,
the condition will be considered a covenant. For a thorouqh discussion of defeasible estates, see McCall, Fstates on Condition and on Special Limitat;on i
North Carolina, 19 N. C. L. Rvv. 334 (1941).
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estate in fee simple determinable is created to revest title in the grantor
upon the occurrence of a named event. 10 The intent of the grantor
that the estate shall then expire automatically 20 may be expressed by
appropriate words 2 ' which provide that upon the happening of the
event the land is to revert2 2 to the conveyor.23 The estate thus granted
is of defeasible quality while the grantor retains a possibility of reverter.2 4 When the contingency arises, the estate ipso facto reverts in
25
accordance with its terms.
The conveyor's manifest intention that the estate be limited to certain uses led the court to reason that he had the right to give away
what he chose and to provide that his bounty should be enjoyed only
by those whom he intended to enjoy it. "We know of no law that prohibits a white man from conveying a fee determinable upon the limitation that it shall not be used by members of any race except his own,
nor of any law that prohibits a negro from conveying a fee determinable upon the limitation that it shall not be used by members of
'26
any race, except his own."

The court also stated that the reverter provision must be given
full force and effect lest the grantor be deprived of his property without due process of law. 2 7 Conceding that the determinable fee is valid,
if the court decided that the estate could not revert in case Negroes
used the property, a determination of the grantor's rights under the
Due Process Clause would necessarily follow. However, if the limitation were for any reason void, the reverter would become inoperative,
28
and the grantor's constitutional rights would not seem to be affected.
"A fee on limitation results if the prevailing purpose is to limit the land for

a stated use. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.6 (1952).
20

It is a basic requirement that the estate shall automatically expire upon

the occurrence of a stated event. 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 44 (1936).
21 "While," "until," "so long as" are typical words to denote the special limita-

tion.

1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 91 (2d ed. 1920).

22 However, no express words of reverter are necessary.

1 SIMEs, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 181 (1936).
231 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 44, comment 1, Illustration 17 (1936).
24 Notwithstanding the qualifications annexed to it, a fee simple determinable
estate constitutes the entire estate throughout its continuance. Church in Brattle
Square v. Grant, 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1855).
25
Elmore v. Austin, 232 N. C. 12, 59 S. E. 2d 205 (1950). A fee simple on
special limitation is generally considered not to be within the Rule Against Perpetuities. First Universalist Society of North Adams v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171,
29 N. E. 524 (1892). A provision designed to prevent use or occupancy of property by members of the excluded group is not a restraint of alienation. 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 406, comment in (1936).
2'242 N. C. at 322, 88 S. E. 2d at 123.
" The Court here spoke of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The writer assumes that the Court intended to refer to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
28 Where an estate in fee simple determinable is created with a special limitation which is void, the gift is good and is no longer subject to the limitation. 2
SIMES. FUTURE INTERESTS § 611 (1936).
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The effect of this decision, in view of what has been stated, is that
restrictive provisions annexed to a grant of land may now be "enforced" by resort to the fee simple determinable. The court's abrupt
dismissal of Shelley v. Kraemer was no doubt prompted by a refusal
to read "state action" into the case, relying heavily upon the automatic nature of the reverter. The decision carefully explained that
no court action is ever necessary to terminate the estate and put the
reversion into operation when the stated event occurs.
However, the court did not purport to adjudicate finally all "state
action" aspects as its sole duty was to render construction of the deed.
Although the reversion provision would take effect automatically upon
prohibited use of the land, the grantee might refuse to relinquish possession voluntarily. The grantor would be forced to bring an action
in ejectment, 29 seeking to obtain a judgment declaring the conveyance
forfeited and awarding him possession. Would a judgment in his favor
be "state action" in violation of the grantee's constitutional rights? It
may be contended that a court decree in favor of the grantor would,
under these circumstances, relate back to the time prior to which the
reverter took effect and indirectly enforce the restrictive provisions. If
this construction is accepted, the decree would probably be unenforceable as contra to the Shelley rule. However, looking at the reality of
the situation, this action in ejectment would be analogous to an action
by the owner of property against an adverse possessor, and no violation
of the latter's constitutional rights would seem to be involved.
The courts, however, are not the only agency by which the state
acts. In the instant case the title vested in the grantor by "operation
of law," i.e., by operation of the common law of the state. Quaere,
would the operation of the common law of the state be "state action"
within the Shelley v. Kraemer rule and thus be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment ?30
Also, the grantee may contend that the state's failure to interfere
with the operation of the reversion in essence tolerated its dispossessory
effect, giving force to the restrictions, since timely interference might
have avoided the termination of the grantee's estate.31 However, it
The party who claims the better title
2' 18 Am. Jum., Ejectment § 40 (1939).
must, if the actual possession of the land is refused, make a lawful demand for
possession and resort to process of law to recover his property. Mosseller v.
Deaver, 106 N. C. 494, 11 S. E. 529 (1890).
"0"[L]aw in the sense in which the courts speak of it today does not exist
without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is
enforced in a State . . . [is] the law of that State existing by the authority of
that State." Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 79 (1938), citing Justice
Holmes' dissent in Black & White T. & T. Co. v. Brown & Yellow T. & T. Co.,
226 U. S. 518, 533 (1928).
"1In Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, 469 (1953) Justice Black, writing for
the majority, presented a similar viewpoint in a case which involved the appli-
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would seem that since Shelley v. Kraemer expressly upheld voltntary
action in "enforcement" of restrictive provisions, the unhindered operation of the grant, like the voluntary execution of a contract, would not
32
constitute "state action" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Assuming, then, the legal validity of the conveyance, would considerations of public interest tend to override its efficacy? In the Racial
Restrictive Covenant Cases33 the Supreme Court emphasized that "[the
Fourteenth] Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct";34 that the legal devices containing such restrictions are not
against public policy. A distinction between those cases and the principal case may be drawn at this point. Shelley v. Kraemer and Jackson
v. Barrows dealt with conveyances of property between private parties
for private use. The instant case, on the other hand, contains certain
restrictive requirements imposed on the City of Charlotte and the Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission, a municipal corporation, for
public use. Have the courts established a different policy as to public
use, as distinguished from private use?
In 1896 the Supreme Court recognized that equal protection was
accorded where substantially equal but separate facilities were provided
by a public transportation system.3 5 The same principle was consistently applied in subsequent state and federal cases on the use of public
recreational facilities, 3 6 golf courses, 37 swimming pools, 3 8 tenement houscation of the Fifteenth Amendment to test the Texas pre-primary.

He declared

that the state's condonation of the use of the jaybird pre-primary as an electoral
device violated the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment and took the position
that mere failure to suppress a practice not even unlawful under state law, but
affecting the rights of its Negro citizens, was such state action as prohibited by
the Amendment. "A state may not permit within its borders the use of any device
that produces an equivalent of [a violation]."
"2However, in the absence of state action, voluntary discriminatory practices
may nevertheless be unlawful per se since they may act as a general restraint
on mortgage lending and similar activities affecting interstate commerce. Comment, Application of the Sherman Act to Housing Segregation, 63 YALE L. J.
1124 (1954).
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24
(1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
"4Shelley v. Kraemer, supra at 13 (1948).
5 The "Separate but Equal" doctrine apparently originated in Massachusetts
where a school board resolution to provide separate facilities for Negro children
in Boston was upheld in Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849). It was
formally announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) which established
a test of reasonableness based on usage, customs and traditions of the people and
the preservation of the public peace and good order.
" There seem to be no affirmative decisions in the Supreme Court on the
validity of the "Separate but Equal" doctrine in the field of public recreation.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U. S. 974 (1954)
("Separate but Equal" sustained in lower court) ; Williams v. Kansas City, Mo..
346 U. S. 826 (1953) (injunctive relief granted below) ; Rice v. Arnold, 342
U. S. 946 (1952) (Florida court had held that proper procedure to test the issue
was by bill for declaratory judgment or in mandamus); Boyer v. Garrett, 340
U. S. 912 (1951) (application for certiorari not filed within time limits). Conversely, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated in Berry v. Durham, 186
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ing3" and places of entertainment. 40 It endured until the Court in Brown
v. Board of Education41 examined its applicability in the light of current knowledge of human relations. 4 - The Supreme Court found in that
case that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal, ' 43 though

physical facilities and other "tangible" factors were substantially equal.
In a technical sense, the School Cases do not invalidate separate but
equal facilities as a matter of public policy except in the use of gradeschool buildings. Yet, it seems to be certain that they do have a bearing
44
on decisions in other fields.
One week after the Brown decision, the Supreme Court handed
N. C. 421, 119 S. E. 748 (1923) that restrictive covenants were in accord with
practice and policy and that reasonable regulations may be made to separate
the races.
"'Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F. 2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. den. 347 U. S. 974
(1954).
" Kansas City, Mo. v. Williams, 205 F. 2d 47 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. den.
346 U. S.826 (1953). Cf. Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1944)
(citizens of Mexican descent are entitled to equal rights and privileges).
"Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N. Y. 512, 87 N. E. 2d 541 (1949),
cert. den. 339 U. S.981 (1950), held that a private corporation organized to provide low-cost housing is not an agency of the state and as such not prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment from discriminating against tenants because of
race or color, although it derived public aid through partial tax exemption and
permission to buy land, acquired by the exercise of the state's power of eminent
domain, at cost.
40 Harris v. Daytona Beach, 105 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
" 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court found it
neither necessary nor desirable to re-examine the principle of "separate but
equal" facilities in the field of education, though it had several opportunities to
do so. Missouri ex. rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v.
University of Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631 (1948); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U. S.637 (1950). In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S.629 (1950), the
Supreme Court stated that it was unnecessary to deal with that doctrine in the
light of contemporary knowledge respecting the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and the effect on racial segregation.
" Compare the language used in the Brown case: "Segregation of white and
colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of law, for the policy
of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of the child to learn,"
347 U. S. at 494, with the following statement from Plessy v. Ferguson, 165
U. S. 537, 551 (1896): "Laws permitting and even requiring separation . . .
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other.... We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with
a badge of inferiority."
The juxtaposition of the two statements clearly indicates the change in the
Supreme Court's attitude toward this basic problem.
(The quoted passage from the Brown case, supra, was cited by the Supreme
Court as a "finding in the Kansas case" [referring to the District Court's decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kansas 1951)]. However,
the quotation is not contained in the published opinion of the Kansas District
Court.)
43347 U. S. at 495.
44 "What the
[Equal Protection] clause appears to require today is . ..that
there shall be no distinction made on the sole basis of race or alienage as to
certain rights." CoRwI N, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 204
(9th ed. 1947).
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

down six memorandum decisions, 45 one of which involved the refusal
of admission of Negroes to an amphitheater leased by a private theatrical company in a public park.46 The trial court had held the company
not guilty of unlawful discrimination in excluding the Negroes from its
performances. The Supreme Court vacated the ruling and remanded
for consideration in the light of the Brown case. 47 This is a strong
indication that the policy announced in the School Cases would be applied to recreational facilities.
A recent circuit court decision makes it even more apparent that
an extension of the School Cases doctrine is being made in other fields.
In an action brought to abolish separate facilities for the races on city
busses, the South Carolina District Court observed that ".

.

. to hold

that the Brown decision extends to the field of public transportation
would be an unwarranted enlargement of the doctrine .

. .

. One's

education and personality is (sic) not developed on a city bus.' '8 However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the lower court,
stated that ".

.

. the recent decisions in Brown v. Board of Education

and Bolling v. Sharpe which relate to public schools, leave no doubt that
the separate but equal doctrine approved in Plessy v. Ferguson has been
repudiated. That the principle applied in the school cases should be
applied in cases involving transportation, appears quite clearly from
the recent case of Henderson v. United States where segregation in
dining cars was held violative of a section of the interstate commerce
49
act providing against discrimination."
"'Three of the six decisions were concerned with education. The Court va-

cated judgments against Negro applicants to the University of Florida in State of
Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 347 U. S. 971 (1954) and
Louisiana State University in Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana
State University, 347 U. S. 971 (1954). These two cases were remanded for
consideration in the light of the Brown decision. In the third case, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and refused to review a ruling by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals that denial of admission to a Texas junior college based on
proof of equal facilities in Negro schools was violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. Wichita Falls junior College District v. Battle, 347 U. S. 974 (1954).
In Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U. S. 974 (1954), the court below was directed to
enter judgment which required a municipality to admit Negroes on a substantially equal basis with white citizens to a public golf course, and in Housing
Authority of the City and County of San Francisco v. Banks, 347 U. S. 974
(1954) the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the California court to review a
judgment requiring a local housing board to admit Negroes on an equal basis
with other residents. However, none of these cases involved a direct ruling on
the issue of segregation.
"'Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U. S. 971 (1954).
"' Sweeney v. Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525 (W. D. Ky. 1951), aff'd sub non.
Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 202 F. 2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), vacated
347 U. S.971 (1954).
48 Flemming v. South Carolina Electric
and Gas Co., 128 F. Supp. 469, 470
(E.D.S.C. 1955).
"' Flemming v. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., 224 F. 2d 752 (4th Cir.
1955), appeal docketed, 24 U. S. L. WEEI 3138 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1955) (No. 511).
The School Segregation Cases also influenced a recent Interstate Commerce
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Perhaps of greatest significance is a recent decision of the Supreme
Court itself. In an action"0 brought by Negroes to obtain a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the enforcement of racial
segregation on public bathing beaches, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the combined effect of the Supreme Court's decisions51 was to deny segregation in public places. 52 Evidently this
court felt that a public policy had been established by the Supreme
Court which would apply to cases of this character. 53 The Supreme
54
Court affirmed the circuit court's decision.
Thus, there is reason to believe that the principles underlying these
decisions may be extended to the North Carolina case. 55 A consideration of the instant controversy"5 may give the United States Supreme
Court an opportunity to make that decision.
PETER H. GERNS
Commission decision banning segregation of white and Negro passengers in interstate transportation. The Commission held that segregation of interstate passengers violated the Interstate Commerce Act's provisions against undue preferences and prejudices. Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 24 U. S. L. WEEK 2234 (I.C.C.
Nov. 7, 1955) (busses); National Assn. for Advancement of Colored People v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 24 U. S. L. WEEK 2234 (I.C.C. Nov. 7, 1955)

(railroads).
'oDawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 220 F. 2d 386 (4th

Cir. 1955).

"The Court referred to McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637
(1950) ; Henderson v. U. S., 339 U. S. 816 (1950) ; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) ; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). In the
McLaurin case, the Supreme Court stated that a Negro, admitted to the same
school as whites, need not sit in a special part of the class room, library, and
cafeteria, so as to be apart from white students. His education and mental
growth would suffer by the inequalities imposed upon him.

In the Henderson

case, the court denounced the artificiality of treatment to which Negroes on
railroad dining cars were subjected.
r "[If the state's] power cannot be invoked to sustain racial segregation in

the schools, where attendance is compulsory and racial friction may be appre-

hended from the enforced commingling of the races, it cannot be sustained with

respect to public beach and bathhouse facilities, the use of which is entirely
optional." 220 F. 2d at 387.
" Some writers repeatedly have suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment

intended to protect the rights of the individuals from individual action as well
as from action by the states. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTii AMENDMENT 277 (1908) ; Hale, Rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAW GuniD REv. 627 (1946).
Also note Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559
(1896) : "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens."
" Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U. S. -, 100 L. Ed.
(Advance p. 75) (1955).
" "The protection of the Constitution extends to sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275 (1939).
" The instant case is pending on a petition for re-hearing in the Supreme
Court of North Carolina and may be the subject of an application for a writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Letter from Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Attorney for co-Defendants Leeper et al. to the author,
Sept. 28, 1955.
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Criminal Law-Use of Deadly Force in Preventing Escape of Fleeing
Minor Felon
Under a new statute' any misdemeanant confined in the North Carolina State Prison upon a second conviction of an escape or an attempt
to escape is guilty of a felony. North Carolina prison directives provide that fleeing felons may be shot only if clearly necessary to prevent
escape. 2
Interpreting N. C. Gen Stat. § 148-46 (1952), which provides that
when a convict shall attempt to escape, the prison guard shall use any
means necessary to prevent the escape, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has held that the legislature did not intend to change the common
law rule that a prison guard is not justified in killing a fleeing misdemeanant merely to prevent escape.3 However, in the case of the fleeing felon the common law authorities are unanimous in their opinion
4
that deadly force may, if necessary, be used to prevent escape.
There can be little criticism of the rule as it operated under the
common law. In the first place, felonies were punishable by death.r
Secondly, at a time when officers did not possess our deadly and accurate firearms, it would be difficult to imagine a" situation where an officer would have an opportunity to kill a fleeing felon who was not
resisting arrest on the spot. G Thirdly, it would be unusual for the
arresting officer at common law to find it necessary to kill to prevent
the escape of a felon, since the criminal did not have modern means of
transportation, nor could he find concealment and anonymity so easily.
It would seem, however, that the common law rule can be justly
criticized as it operates on fleeing felons who have committed some
statutory felony, such as the escape offense set out in N. C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-256, or some felony not dangerous to life. The question is what
justification can there be for the use of deadly force in preventing the
escape of the minor felon. 7 Is it punishment for the original offense
or the offense of escaping, for neither of which the statutory penalty
is death? Is it to uphold the lawful authority in the arresting person
or the one preventing escape? If so, the rule should logically be the
N.
C. GEN. STAT. § 14-256 (1955).
N. C. PRISON RULES AND REGULATIONS, c. 41, Directive 21 (Oct. 1953).
'Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C. 185, 136 S. E. 375, 50 A. L. R. 262 (1927).
The common law authorities made no distinction between a misdeanant fleeing from arrest and one breaking away after arrest.
' 1 EAST P. C. 298 (1806) ; 2 HALE P. C. 76-77 (1847) ; 1 HAWK. P. C. 106
(1788).
14 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 98 (1818).
' The case of an offender who is merely fleeing must, of course, be distinguished
from the case where the offender is resisting (State v. Dunning, 177 N. C. 559,
98 S. E. 530 (1919)), or is both resisting and fleeing (State v. Garrett, 60 N. C.
144 (1863)).
'7Arguments pro and con are contained in 9 ALI PROCEEDINGS 179 (1931).

1955]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

same as regards both felon and misdemeanant. Is it to prevent a more
probable danger to life? Statutory felonies include a multitude of
non-violent crimes and some misdemeanors are much more dangerous
to life; for example, contrast the fleeing drunken driver with the fleeing thief. Is it because the minor felon is considered more dangerous
to property? The better reasoned cases hold that deadly force is not8
justified in preventing a felony where property loss alone is involved.
"The reason why the use of such means was allowed to prevent crimes of that kind in England was that they were there
punishable by death. This being so, there was reason for the
rule. If one was about to perpetrate a crime for which under
the law his life would be forfeited there was reason in holding
that his life might be taken if necessary to prevent his committing it. But in this country few crimes subject the ones who
have committed them to the death penalty, and it is only as to
those which do that the reason of the rule has any force. What
were felonies at common law usually subject the offender here
to comparatively light punishment, and upon principle it should
be here held that one could only properly make use of means
which might be expected to cause death to prevent the commission of a capital offense." 9
It would seem, therefore, that the reason for the rule has changed also
in the arresting or escaping situation ;1o for if one cannot kill to prevent
a felony dangerous to property only, should he be permitted to kill in
attempting an arrest after the offense has been completed?
Writers generally criticize the arbitrary distinctions made between
the misdemeanant and the felon.""To attach such importance to a term so loosely used is to
make legal rights and duties dependent upon words, not upon
facts or public policy. It is as vicious an exhibition of the jurisprudence of conceptions as can well be imagined. The word is
the thing. It is of itself a magic quality which compels legal re8 Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329 (1881) ; Starkey v. Dameron, 92 Colo. 420, 21
P. 2d 1112 (1933) ; Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 151 Ky. 496, 152-S. W. 580 (1913) ;
Commonwealth v. Emmons, 57 Pa. Super. 445, 43 A.2d 568- (1945); Pierce v.
Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S. E. 686 (1923).
'Hoyt, C. J., in State v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 487, 39 Pac. 1080, 1082 (1895).
"oAs in the case of a misdemeanant, the common law authorities made no distinction between a felon fleeing from arrest and one breaking away after arrest.

Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 508, 18 S. W. 854, 855 (1892).

' Bohlen and Burns, The Privilege to Protect Property by Dangerous Barriers
and Mechanical Devices, 35 YALE L. J. 525, 540 (1926) ; Pearson, The Right to
Kill in Making Arrests, 28 MIcH. L. Rav. 957, 974 (1930); Rogers, Right of
Offlcer to Shoot and Kill Fleeing Felon, 34 LAw NOTES 66, 70 (1930); Contra,
Waite, Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 448, 466

(1931).
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suits regardless of the facts or of the interest at stake.
ridiculous to make matters of life and death depend
mere whim of the legislative draftsman and to subject
the risk of death merely because the crime which he
mitted is arbitrarily labelled a 'felony' rather than
meanor?-12
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Is it not
upon the
a man to
has coma misde-

It is significant that the Restatement of Torts has recognized that the
proper distinction is between offenses which normally cause or threaten
3
death and those which do not.'

Although criticized by many courts,' 4 the applicability of the rule
in regard to the minor felon seems to be largely untested by actual
court holding.' 5 In Ex parte Warner,'8 however, a federal revenue
agent who claimed he shot a fleeing "moonshiner" by accident was discharged from state custody on writ of habeas corpus. From the evidence presented, the court, relying on the common law rule, said that
the petitioner should be discharged "whether the view taken of the
evidence be that the officer deliberately shot at the deceased while he
was fleeing and escaping from arrest or that in the pursuit the pistol
was accidentally discharged."' 17 Although it would seem that the illegal
manufacture of whiskey is not per se a felony dangerous to life, it cannot be denied that an aura of violence surrounds the profession.1 8
Since an arresting person can only kill if necessary to prevent the
escape of a fleeing felon, many cases are decided on the ground that
the killing was unnecessary. Consequently, if the killing is unnecessary,
there is no need for the court to try to make any distinction between
types of felonies. In justifying the use of deadly force, the burden is
on defendant to the extent of showing authority and probable cause to
overcome a prima facie presumption for the protection of life unless
12 Bohlen and Bums, The Privilege to Protect Property by Dangerous Barriers
and18Mechanical Devices, 35 YALE L. J. 525, 540 (1926).
R STATEMENT, TORTS § 131 (1934).
14 U. S. v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710, 713 (8th Cir. 1881) ; State v. Bryant, 65 N. C.
327, 328 (1871); Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879); Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1102, 1110, 178 S.E. 8,11 (1935).
15 In the following cases the court made no distinction between types of felonies in the escaping situation: Commonwealth v. Stinnet, 55 F. 2d 644 (4th Cir.
1932) (illegal manufacture of whiskey); U. S. v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710 (8th Cir.
1881) (attempted escape from military custody of soldier convicted of malicious
falsehood which carried two year sentence in military prison); Johnson v.
Chesapeake Ry., 259 Ky. 789, 83 S. W. 2d 521 (1935) (larceny); Thompson
v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 116 W. Va. 705, 182 S.E. 880 (1935) (illegal manufacture of whiskey).
'621
F. 2d 542 (N. D. Okla. 1927).
17
Id. at 542.
18 "It is a matter of common knowledge that throughout the years men who
secrete themselves in the fastness of the mountains for the purpose of illicit distillation of spiritous liquors have not been hesitant to take the lives of officers
attempting to bring them to justice." Maxwell, J. in Thompson v. Norfolk and
W. Ry. Co., 116 W. Va. 705, 712, 182 S.E. 880, 884 (1935).
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the circumstances of the killing rebut the presumption.19 Necessity
is a question for the jury and it may be that both jury and appellate
judge2 ° take into account the character of the felony and perhaps the
21
character of the felon himself.
In State v. Bryant,2 2 a hog was stolen from defendant's employer
and the defendant, a private person, suspecting that Cogdell was the
thief went to Cogdell's house, called him out and told him to give up
the hog. Cogdell said that the hog was not there and fled. The defendant ordered him four times to stop and then shot him. The stolen
hog was found in Cogdell's house cut up and cleaned. The defendant
urged that he knew a felony had been committed and thus he had a
right to arrest the felon without a warrant and to prevent the felon's
escape. On these facts, the trial judge held that the defendant was
guilty of assault and battery and so charged the jury. On appeal, in
a per curiam opinion, the North Carolina Supreme Court said that
it was the privilege of every private person to arrest the felon when
a felony has been committed but held that here there was no necessity
to kill. Justice Reade, speaking for the court, said: "It must be however, that the powers of arresting and the means used must be enlarged
or modified by the characted of the felony. The importance to society of
having felons arrested in cases of capital felonies such as murder and
rape must be much greater than in cases of inferior felonies." 23
24
On the question of necessity, although the rule is not settled,
some courts follow the view that mere suspicion that a felony has been
committed is not enough to justify the use of deadly force in preventing
the escape of a suspected felon if in fact no felony has been committed.2 5
Even where a felony has been committed, killing can only be justified
as a last resort.20 Although it has been said that the officer, in case of
resistance, is not bound to put off the arrest until a more favorable
time, 27 ordinarily there is not the same urgency in case of fight.28 In
Castle v. Lewis29 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of a district court in dismissing an application for habeas
Union Indemnity Co. v. Webster, 218 Ala. 468, 477, 118 So. 794, 802 (1928).

1"

20 Hendricks v. Comonwealth, 163 Va. 1102, 1110, 78 S. E. 8, 11 (1935).

-1 Dredd v. State, 26 Ala. App. 594, 164 So. 309, 311 (1935).
2265

N. C. 327 (1871).

"State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327, 328 (1871).
"' See Notes, 38 Ky L. J. 609 and 618.
- Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 70 S. W. 297 (1902); People v. Conraddy, 5 Parker Cr. Rep. 234 (N. Y. 1860); Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa.

Super. 484, 45 A. 2d 235 (1946).
26 Castle v. Lewis, 254 Fed. 917 (8th Cir. 1918); Scarborough v. State, 168
Tenn. 106, 76 S. W. 2d 106 (1934); Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238 S. W.

94 (1921).

Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C. 185, 188, 136 S. E. 375, 377 (1927).
State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 328, 329 (1871).
20254 Fed. 917 (8th Cir. 1918).
27
26
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corpus by two petitioners in state custody who had tried to arrest certain persons whom they suspected were introducing liquor into Osage
County, Oklahoma (a felony). The suspected ones had fled in an automobile and the petitioners had fired their guns at the automobile and
killed one 'losier. The court felt that the fact that all the occupants
of the car except one were known by the officers to be settled residents
of a nearby town only five miles away and the fact that the suspected
ones were heading toward their homes at the time rendered it difficult
to conclude that a person of ordinary prudence could have believed that
it was necessary to fire into the automobile to prevent escape.
Concluding, it seems that even if the North Carolina Supreme Court
does not follow the strong dicta enounced in State v. Bryant which distinguished between types of felonies, an arresting or custodial officer
may find it difficult to show necessity for the use of deadly force in
preventing the escape of the minor felon.
I. B. HUDSON, JR.
Domestic Relations-Conflict of Laws-Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
In a suit brought in Arkansas under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act' thd petitioner filed the necessary papers, 2 which
were certified and sent to the Superior Court of Edgecombe County3
and which charged her husband with non-support of their children.
After concluding that responsibility to support the children had " '...
already been found to exist by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . in
the State of Arkansas,' 1 the superior court entered judgment, requiring the husband to pay into the Edgecombe County Welfare Department the money for support, which was to be forwarded to Arkansas,
to be transmitted to petitioner, then residing in Virginia.3
On appeal the judgment of the lower court was reversed, the reason
being the three-state nature of the proceedings in this case. In the
opinion it was said:
"We do not think the act should be interpreted so as to apply
to a situation other than one where the obligee is present in the
Initiating State .... To interpret the act so as to permit an
1
9A UNIFORm LAWs ANN. 58 (Supp. 1954); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2401
to 34-2427 (Supp. 1953); N. C. GFN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to 52A-19 (Supp. 1953).
Arkansas had repealed the 1950 Uniform Act, 9A ULA 58, 66 (Supp. 1954),
and adopted it as amended in 1952, 9A ULA 58, 92 (Supp. 1954). North Carolina had adopted substantially the Uniform Act of 1950. For a discussion of the
North Carolina Act see Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 351, 423 (1951).
2
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2410 (Supp. 1953).
3
ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-2413 (Supp. 1953).
' Mahan v. Read, 240 N. C. 641, 643, 83 S. E. 2d 706, 708 (1954).
Mahan v. Read, 240 N. C. 641, 83 S. E. 2d 706 (1954).
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obligee to pursue a remedy through the courts of two states when
the obligee is not present in either one of them and perhaps on
the move from place to place would so complicate and confuse the
procedure thereunder as to impair seriously its manifest purpose
and its usefulness in proper cases." 6
For this reason it was held that the lower court had no authority to
make an award for transmittal to the Arkansas court, to be transmitted
in turn to the petitioner in Virginia.
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act7 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) was designed to cope with a problem that had
for many years been a thorn in the flesh of welfare departments all
over the United States.8 When a husband or father deserted his family
and fled to another state, little could be done to force him to provide
for his dependents. Civil proceedings in another jurisdiction were
usually beyond the means of those left destitute, and criminal prosecution was futile as a means of obtaining support.9 Those left without
maintenance became an increasing burden on charitable organizations
and welfare departments.'0 This was the state of affairs considered
by its sponsors when reciprocal legislation on the question was proposed.
The present case does not exemplify the typical situation as envisioned by the framers of the Act in that it ".

.

. presents the problem

of the roving obligee rather than the fugitive obligor."" The husband
and wife resided in North Carolina until the wife left their place of
abode and removed to Arkansas, taking their children with her and
obtaining a divorce from the husband, who remained in North Carolina. Desertion by the wife does not affect the duty of the husband
to support his children, nor is it necessary that the husband or father
2
be a fugitive before support is imposed under the Act.'
Id.at 647, 83 S. E. 2d at 711 (1954).
'As of Dec. 1, 1954, of 48 states and 4 territories all but Nevada and District
of Columbia had enacted some form of reciprocal legislation on this question, 5
states having adopted the Council of State Governments' form of Support of
Dependents Act, which is similar to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act. 1954 HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws 227.
8 See Notes, 25 TEMP. L. Q. 336 (1952) and 45 ILL. L. REv. 252 (1951).
o See Brockelbank, The Problem of Family Support: A New Uniform Act
Offers a Solution, 37 A. B. A. J. 93 (1951).

Ibid.
" Mahan v. Read, 240 N. C. 641, 647, 83 S.E. 2d 706, 711 (1954).
12 See Freeman v. Freeman, 226 La. 410, 76 So. 2d 414 (1954),
where, after
divorce was granted in Mississippi, husband went to Louisiana, and wife re20

turned to Arkansas, where she instituted the action for support of their children.

In Landres v. Landres, 207 Misc. 460, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 442 (N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
1955), wife left husband in New York and went to California, where she
initiated the action for support of their children. In Smith v. Smith, 281 P. 2d
274, 278 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1955), it was said: "They (the Acts) are based
upon the failure to provide needed support for dependents, and the flight of the
obligor is in no way made the controlling fact."

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

In respect to the roving obligee, however, the circumstances are
different. This case is the only decision of an appellate court under the
Act involving a three-state situation. Thus there was no precedent for
this interpretation of the North Carolina Act,13 restricting its application to cases where the obligee is residing in the initiating state at the
time of the proceedings in the responding state.14 A literal interpretation of a phrase of the Acts, ".

..

regardless of the presence or resi-

dence of the obligee,"'r5 might lead to a different conclusion, but the
drafters of the original act indicated' 6 that the quoted words were used
as if to say, "regardless of whether the obligee is in this state," rather
than, "regardless of which foreign state the obligee is in." As the court
points out, the object of the Act was not only to enable obligees to
acquire support more easily, but also to relieve the state of their residence of the burden of supporting them. Since Virginia had become
the residence of the obligee, it seems logical that that state should have
been the one in which proceedings were initiated.
The court also said that the superior court
reaching the conclusion that the respondent's

"...
'...

was in error in
responsibility to

support said children has already been found to exist by a court of competent jurisdiction ... in the State of Arkansas.' -17 (Emphasis added.)
The findings of the court in the initiating state are not for the purpose
of determining the rights between the parties but are to determine
whether the complaint ". . . sets forth facts from which it may be determined that the defendant owes a duty of support and that a court of
the responding state may obtain jurisdiction of the defendant or his
property .. *"Is Under the Acts of the two states it was not intended
" Cf. Vincenza v. Vincenza, 197 Misc. 1027, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 470 (N. Y. Dom,

Re]. Ct. 1950), where the court of the initiating state refused to certify the petition
as a matter of judicial discretion in deciding against extending the Support of
Dependents Act.
"This case does not decide, of course, what is to happen if, at some time
after the final judgment for support has been rendered, obligee moves from the
initiating state, but at least the initiating state under this decision is not to be
burdened with distribution of support payments to the obligee who removes from
that5 state prior to any judgment in the responding state.
" ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2404 (Supp. 1953) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-5 (Supp.
1953), which say in part: "The duty of support . . .bind(s) the obligor regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee."
16 "The
purpose here is to overcome the rule in some states that the duty of
support runs only in favor of obligees within the state, and to overcome the indifference of many states which would refuse or neglect to support in favor of
out-of-state dependents on the theory often only tacitly admitted, that one state
has no interest in helping another state rid itself of the burden of supporting destitute families." 1952 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMIlSSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 292.
17 Mahan v. Read, 240 N. C. 641, 646, 83 S. E. 2d 706, 710 (1954).
8
' ARIc. STAT. ANN. § 34-2413 (Supp. 1953); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-11
(Supp. 1953). (Arkansas statute uses "respondent" instead of "defendant").
A 1955 amendment to N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-19, N. C. Sess. Laws 1955,
c. 699, § 10, makes the verified complaint from the initiating state prima facie
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that substantive rights should be determined by the court of the initiating state. 19 Obviously the court in Arkansas did not have jurisdiction to find that respondent owed a duty of support to his children,
for respondent was not before that court and had, in fact, never been
in Arkansas. The action taken by the Arkansas court was merely part
of the procedure 2° by which the petitioner was able to present herself
before the North Carolina court without necessity of personal appearance.

21

The question of the real party in interest was another feature of
this case. The Arkansas Act allows a person having legal custody of
a minor obligee to bring suit,2 2 but North Carolina law required that
suit be brought in the name of the infant by general or testamentary
guardian or duly appointed next friend.2 3 For this reason, since petitioner had instituted the action for the support of her children in her
own name, it was said that there was a defect of parties plaintiff.
Since it is generally recognized that the law of the place of trial determines who may sue,m it is only in the Acts themselves that a different
answer can be sought. The only section of the North Carolina Act
which allowed election of laws 25 does not seem to apply unless the real
party in interest requirement can be tortured into becoming a "remedy.' ' 26 This question has become largely academic as far as North
Carolina is concerned because of the amendments to the North Caroevidence of the facts contained in it so long as defendant has been served with
notice and summons; and, if after service defendant does not appear, the court
may enter an order for support anyway.
10 See Brockelbank, Is
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
Constitutional? 31 ORE. L. REv. 97, 107 (1952) ; appearing simultaneously in
17 Mo. L. REv. 1, 12 (1952). Professor Brockelbank was chairman of the committee which prepared the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act for
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
" For decisions upholding the constitutionality of this procedure, see Duncan v.
Smith, 262 S. W. 2d 373 (Ky. 1953); Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal. App. 2d 154,
270 P. 2d 613 (1954).
"2 In this case, however, petitioner was present at the hearing.
ARKC. STAT. ANN. § 34-2412 (Supp. 1953).
-1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-64 (1953) and annotations thereunder.
54
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 588 (1934).
2

"The duty of support imposed by the laws of this State or by the laws of

the state where the obligee was present when the failure to support commenced...
and the remedies provided for enforcement thereof
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-5. (Emphasis added.)

. . .

bind the obligor

. .

Because of the election of laws given under an identically worded statute an
Ohio respondent was held to have been denied equal protection of the laws of
Ohio when Pennsylvania petitioner elected the support laws of Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania ex rel. Dep't of Public Assistance v. Mong, 160 Ohio St. 455, 117
N. E. 2d 32 (1954), 29 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1480, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 938.
" Certainly, what is meant by the phrase in N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-5, "remedies provided for the enforcement thereof," are the "terms and conditions" to
which the court of the responding state may subject defendant as set forth in
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-15 (Supp. 1953).
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27

lina Act passed by the 1955 General Assembly.
These amendments,
among other things, take away the obligee's privilege of a questionable
election of laws -8 and provide that the person having legal custody of
a minor may bring suit.29 In the instant case the court said that the
complete answer to the essentially identically worded Arkansas statute
was that ". . . this provision is not in the North Carolina Act." ° The
1955 amendment places the provision in the North Carolina Act and
apparently authorizes suit in the name of the legal custodian or guardian.
With the real party in interest question fairly well settled by statute
and with the finding of a duty to support clearly the concern of the
court in the responding state, the importance of the instant decision
lies in the interpretation of the Act as requiring an obligee to be
residing in the initiating state during the proceedings in the responding state. To avoid undue complication in the administration of the
support funds, to remove a burden on a state no longer interested in
the matter, and to aid in the uniformity of application of the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, it is hoped that other jurisdictions will adopt this interpretation.
JAMES P. CREWS
Eminent Domain-Limited Access Highways
".... I can go no further, Sir; my
old bones ache. Here's a maze trod
indeed through forth-rights and meanders !"
The Tempest, Act III, Sc. III.
Which lament might well be echoed by the puzzled motorist confronted by the clover-leafs, under and overpasses, traffic circles and
other highway engineering stunts that seem to have mushroomed since
the last war. These and other measures have been required by the
great increase of traffic on our highways, which has made necessary a
basic reconsideration of our highway systems.
The desire for increased safety plus a need for more efficient com=1N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 699. See Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 513, 550 (1955).
The changes made by this act place North Carolina in the group of states
which have adopted the 1952 Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.

Since a majority of the states and territories have adopted the 1952 Act, reciprocity will be augmented for North Carolina.
28 N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 699,
§ 4. "Duties of support applicable under
this Act are those imposed or imposable under the laws of any state where the
obligor was present during the period or any part of the period for which support
is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state
during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown."
29 N. C. Sess. Laws
1955, c. 699, § 6(d). "A complaint on behalf of a minor
obligee may be brought by a person having legal custody of the minor without
appointment as next friend."
"0Mahan v. Read, 240 N. C. 641, 648, 83 S.E. 2d 706, 712 (1954).
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munication between urban areas has given rise to the construction of
what are called variously "Limited Access Highways," or "Freeways."
Basically these are highways to which abutting property owners do
not have their usual "right of egress and ingress,"' but rather are permitted to have access to the highway at designated intersections only,
or to retain their present access, but only at the pleasure of the highway department. Obviously, such highways are designed primarily
for through traffic. It will be the purpose of this note to discuss some
of the various problems that have already arisen and promise to reappear to plague our courts.
When the state condemns land for highways under its power of
eminent domain, the state obtains only an easement of passage, 2 the
owner of the land taken for the public use reserving the fee. 3 Upon
vacation of the highway by the state, the land normally reverts to the
4
owner, discharged of the easement.
Landowners whose tracts abut on the highway have a universally
5
recognized common law easement of access to the abutting highway
'E.g., Calumet Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Chicago et al. v. City of
Chicago et al., 306 Ill. App. 524, 29 N. E. 2d 292 (1940); County Park Commission of Camden Co. v. Kimble, 24 N. J.Super. 221, 93 A. 2d 647 (1952);
Davis v. Alexander, 202 N. C. 130, 162 S.E. 372 (1932) ; In re Appropriation
of Easement for Highway Purposes, - Ohio -, 112 N. E. 2d 411, 415 (1952) ;
City of Norman v. Safeway Stores, 193 Okla. 534, 145 P. 2d 765 (1944) ; Highway
Commission v. Burk et al., 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d 783 (1954) ; 2 Af. LAW OF
PROPERTY 494 (1952); see Notes, 100 A. L. R. 491; 47 A. L. R. 902; 22 A. L. R.
942; 36 IoWA L. REv. 150 (1950).
- Absent an express statutory sanction the state may acquire land for highways by two methods: (1) by voluntary act of owner, and (2) by condemnation. By the former method the state may obtain the fee. By the latter, only
an easement. Barclay v. Howell, 6 Pet. 498 (U. S. 1832) ; Lindel Realty Co.

v. Miller, 2 N. J.Super. 204, 62 A. 2d 817 (1948).
Purvis v. Busey, 260 Ala. 373, 71 So. 2d 18 (1954); People v. Thompson,
43 Cal. 2d 13, 271 P. 2d 507 (1954); Hildebrand v. Telegraph Co., 219 N. C.
402, 14 S. E. 2d 252 (1941) (Telephone Co. not allowed to use highway easement without compensating owner of fee.) ; Davis v. Alexander, 202 N. C. 130,
162 S.E. 372 (1932) ; Brown v. Electric Co., 138 N. C. 533, 51 S.E. 62 (1905) ;
State v. Jesse Hewell, 90 N. C. 705, 706 (1884) (Jesse was released from an
indictment for carrying a concealed weapon in public when it was shown he
was carrying it on a public highway passing over his father's land. Ashe, J.,
found him to be on his own property since the fact that a public road is over
the land does not deprive a man of his freehold in the soil: "his title continues
in the soil, and the public acquires only an easement, that is, a right of passing
and repassing."); Raleigh and Gaston Ry. v. Richard Davis, 19 N. C. 451
(1837) ; Breinig et ux. v. County of Allegheny et al., 332 Pa. 474, 2 A. 2d 842
(1938) (Owner of fee may control use of highway inconsistent with the easement of passage, i.e. continuous parking.) ; Bond v. Green et al., 189 Va. 23,
52 S.E. 2d 169 (1949) ; Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. B1. 526, 126 E. R. 684 (1795);
2 Amr. LAW OF PROPERTY 482 (1952).
' Bond v. Green et al, supra note 3.
' Cases cited note 1 supra. But cf. Calumet Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
of Chicago et al. v. City of Chicago et al., 306 I1. App. 524, 29 N. E. 2d 292
(1940). (Where abutting landowner attempted to enjoil construction of a curb
by the city which would necessitate the abutter's customers traveling a circuitous
route to obtain access. The abutter was thrown on his remedy at law, the court
holding the abutter's riahts are subservient to reasonable use of police power
in the interest of public safety.)
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at any and all points. And when the state deprives the owner of abutting land of his access to the highway, extinguishing the easement,'
he is entitled to compensation 7 even if the state has acquired the land
in fee.' This is explained on the basis that the right of access to a
public highway is an incident of ownership of abutting property, 9 and
the taking thereof is, consequently, a "taking of property."' 0 Thus,
where a municipality vacated a street and conveyed it in fee to a
private individual, and "the street . . . [was] necessary to free and
convenient access to the premises of a particular owner, his right to
such use is appurtenant to his premises and cannot be taken without
payment of damages."" The courts, while they require damages when
the abutting owner's right of access is harmed by a re-routing or vacation of the highway,' 2 recognize no vested right in any particular flow
of traffic over the highway, leaving regulation of traffic to the proper
authorities in the exercise of their police power.13 Even when the
E.g., In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, - Ohio -,
112 N. E. 2d 411, 415 (1952) and cases cited therein.
' Schiefelbein v. U. S., 124 F. 2d 945 (1942); Ridgway v. City of Osceola,
139 Iowa 590, 117 N. W. 974 (1908); Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19
N. W. 2d 394 (1945) ; Davis v. Alexander, 202 N. C. 130, 162 S. E. 372 (1932) ;
Thomas v. Farrier, 179 Okla. 263, 65 P. 2d 526 (1937) ; Note 36 IowA L. REV.
150 (1950).
. County Park Comm. of Camden Co. v. Kimble, 24 N. J. Super. 221, 93
A. 2d 647 (1952); Highway Commission v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d 783
(1954).
'Lindel Realty Co. v. Miller, 2 N. J. Super. 204, 62 A. 2d 817 (1948) (And
exist whether the fee is in the public or in private owner subject to public easement); 39 C. J. S., Highways § 141.
10 Schiefelbein v. U. S., 124 F. 2d 945 (1942) (P owned triangle of 700 acres,
bounded on two sides by a river. The government straightened the river, thus
completely isolating P's tract, although not trespassing on the tract itself. P's
theory of recovery is in the destruction of the highway leading to his land. Held:
The owner of land has a private property right in a public highway if the only
access to his land is over that highway. A vacation of the highway is a taking
of his property for which he is entitled to compensation. N. B.; The property
taken here is not the land, but the private property of condemnee in the highway.) ; Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N. W. 2d 394 (1945).
" Ridgway v. City of Osceola, 139 Iowa 590, 593, 117 N. W. 974, 975 (1908)
("Where [a] street or alley is necessary to free and convenient access to the
premises of a particular owner, his right to such use is appurtenant to his
premises and cannot be taken away without payment of damages.").
12 People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P. 2d 799 (1943) (Poor Mr. Ricciardi was happy enough until the state chose his locale to create a veritable
nightmare of cloverleafs, under and overpasses, and express, local, and service
lanes. Even his abutter's right to visibility was affected, one state's witness
admitting, "it is my opinion that the view will be sufficiently interfered with so
that anyone desiring to reach Mr. Ricciardi's property will be inclined to lose
his way on account of the circuitous route and fail to reach the property for
that reason." Held: Here there is more than a mere diversion of traffic. There
is a diversion of the highway itself, taking, in effect, his property rights in the
highway.)
1 People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P. 2d 702 (1951) (Construction
of strip dividing highway on which P abuts not compensable although inconvenient.) ; Jones Beach Boulevard Estate v. Robert Moses, 268 N. Y. 362, 197
N. E. 313 (1935) (Reductio ad absurdum: P was abutter on a parkway where
no one was allowed to make a left turn on entering except around "plazas" pro-
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state, having abandoned or vacated a public highway deeds it to a
private owner, there is authority holding that such owner may not
obstruct the road if to do so will substantially hinder other owners'
access to their property.1 4 And the same proposition seems to apply
when the state's highway easement is vacated and the land reverts to
the abutting owners. Even when the state, under its powers of eminent domain, takes an abutter's right of access, the abutter has a cause
of action for compensation for the loss of this vested right whether
the state actually takes his land or not. 15
Suppose, however, a highway is newly located as a Limited Access
highway. Do abutters have any vested rights of access such as would
entitle them to compensation? The few cases that have involved this
question seem to answer it in the negative,' reasoning that there can
be no detriment to a right of easement which never existed and no compensation for a loss never sustained.
A recent Ohio case 17 involves the more intricate problem of the
designation of an existing highway 8 as a limited access highway under
the fairly typical Ohio statute. 19
vided for that purpose. Nearest "plaza" to P is five miles away, therefore, in
order to go to town P had to drive five miles on one side of road to the plaza,
then turn around and come back. Held: Proper and uniform application of police
powers. Once access is given, and abutter is on the highway, he is treated just
as other traveler thereon.)
1" Long et al v. Melton, 218 N. C. 94, 10 S. E. 2d 699 (1940) ; Davis v. Alexander, 202 N. C. 130, 162 S. E. 472 (1932). While the North Carolina court
speaks of a maxim, "Once a highway always a highway," in all-inclusive terms,
the decided cases all deal with hardship situations. In Long v. Melton, supra,
however, three justices dissented, feeling that the majority's view should be
restricted to cases where access is cut off completely. Lindauer v. Hill, - Okla.
262 P. 2d 697 (1953).
" Department of Public Works v. Lanter, 413 Ill. 581, 110 N. E. 2d 179
(1953); Nichols v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 581, 121 N. E. 2d 56 (1954);
City of Norman v. Safeway Stores, 193 Okla. 534, 145 P. 2d 765 (1944)
Shapera v. Allegheny County, 344 Pa. 473, 25 A. 2d 566 (1942).
1" Thus where P
was originally separated from a certain street by an intervening lot, and that lot was condemned by highway commission for use as "freeway," P was held to have acquired no compensable right of access by virtue of
construction of the freeway. Since he had no right of access before the conversion of the street into a freeway, nothing was taken from him by the failure
to give him access when the conversion took place. Compensation in such a case,
said Gibson, C. J., would be a gift rather than damages. Schnider v. State, 38
Cal. 2d 439, 241 (1952). The Schnider case, supra, was cited by the California
court when a limited access highway was constructed where no road had before
existed. Brand, J., stated that the California and United States constitutions
require compensation for the taking of easements only if there are easements to
take. Highway Comm. v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d 783 (1954). See Rothwell v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 517, 127 N. E. 2d 524 (1955).
1 Rothwell v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 517, 127 N. E. 2d 524 (1955).
"8The case involved a 13.58 mile section of Route 40, also known as the
National Road, which was originally constructed by the War Department with
funds appropriated by Congress. Construction was begun in 1825 and completed in 1837. [Record, p. 12.1
1" OIlO GENERAL COD
§ 1178-21 (Page, 1946) : Which authorizes the director of highways to "lay out, establish . . . regulate . . . 'Limited Access High-
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Petitioners were abutting property owners and brought action to
enjoin the state highway director from designating a 13.58 mile portion
of route 40 as a limited access highway. Petitioners urged that the
state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection 20 would
be violated in that the state highway director had treated abutters along
this one stretch of highway in six different manners. 21 They contended
also that the words of § 1178-21 Ohio Gen. Code (1946), "access to which
[limited access highway] may be allowed only at highway intersections
designated by the director," mean "access is allowable only at highway
intersections designated by the director." And, finally, that the highway
in question was not "especially designed for through traffic" and therefore did not come within the statutory definition of "Limited Access
22
Highway."
The court of common pleas and the court of appeals held the director had exceeded his authority in that the 13.58 mile portion was not
"especially designed for through traffic" as the statute required, but
rather "was designed to serve all comers1 23 when it was rebuilt in 1949.
The lower courts also held that the equal protection clauses of the Ohio
and federal constitutions were violated in that "persons similarly situated [were not] . . .accorded equal treatment."'

that while the constitution permits classification,2

These courts found

such classification

ways' . . . within this state" in the same manner as he might lay out etc. ordinary highways, and authorizes him to extinguish by purchase, gift, agreement
or condemnation existing easements of access thereto. The director was further
"authorized" to lay out and construct "service highways" to provide access from
areas adjacent to the Limited Access highways. A Limited Access Highway
is defined by the Ohio statute as "a highway especially designed for through
traffic and over which abutting property owners have no easement or right of
access by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such highway, and
access to which may be allowed only at highway intersections designated by the
director."
"OU. S. CoNsT. Art. XIV, § 1; OHio CoNsT. Art. I, § 2.
21 The court of common pleas found that in two cases no restriction of access
was sought by the Highway Department; in four cases access was restricted
only from part of abutter's property; in five cases all access was excluded, but
eight driveways were constructed onto the highway from these parcels; in five
cases all access was excluded -except for one driveway directly onto the highway
in each deed; in four cases all right of access was excluded and no access provided; and in four cases no restriction of access was imposed. Brief for Appellant, app. II, p. 3, Rothwell v. Linzell, supra note 17.
2 See note 19 .mpra.
2 Brief for Appellant, app. II,
p. 5, Rothwell v. Linzell, note 17, supra.
2 Brief for Appellant, app. II, p. 6, Rothwell v. Linzell, note 17 supra; see
note 21 supra.
2 Thus, an ordinance forbidding trucks from displaying other than their own
advertising because of an alleged tendency to distract other drivers, was held
not violative of equal protection clause because the classification had reference
to the purpose of the regulation. Railway Express Co. v. New York, 336 U. S.
106 (1949). Where the statute permitted retention of already established access,
but forbade new access. Held, not an unjust discrimination; "classification by
which unsuitable conditions are restrained within their existing extent is not
unreasonable." Opinion of the Justices. - N. H. -, 105 A. 2d 924, 926 (1954) ;
cited in Wiseman v. Merrill, N. H. -.
109 A. 2d 42 (1954) (established
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must have some reasonable basis.26 Nor did they concur with the
director's contention that he was given the authority to restrict access
27
in this case under the police power.
On appeal the Ohio Supreme Court, Taft, J., reversed. Taking as
his text the words of the statute, he held the words in the definition
of a limited access highway, "access to which may be allowed only at
28
highway intersections designated by the director," to be permissive,
simply showing "the extent to which rights of access to a limited access
highway might be curtailed or eliminated." Continuing, Justice Taft
paused to observe "considerable weight" should be given an administrative determination by the highway director that a highway was
"especially designed" 2 as a limited access highway, and clinched his
rationale for holding the director to be within his statutory authority
by noting, "It is obviously not necessary that a highway be designed
'exclusively' for through traffic in order to be 'especially' designed for
through traffic."
Nor did the supreme court find that the director was required to
construct "service highways" to provide access at the designated intersections for abutters whose access to the highway had been acquired
or condemned. They left these decisions, as well as the deciding of
whose access rights are to be acquired, to the discretion of the director.
The question of equal protection received short shrift: the court
stated that such a question can obviously be raised only where the
extinguishment of access is by condemnation. For such a loss, the
owner is entitled to compensation for decrease in value of his property. 30
businesses allowed to retain access.); Jones Beach Blvd. Estate v. Moses, 268
N. Y. 362, 197 N. E. 313 (1935) ; Suddreth v. Charlotte, 223 N. C. 630, 633, 27
S. E. 2d 650, 653 (1943) (Barnhill, J.: "The discriminations which invalidate

an ordinance are those where persons [in the same class] are subjected to different restrictions or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions.").
- And here there was nothing on the record indicating a reasonable basis for
discrimination. Brief of Appellant, app. II, p. 7.
" Breinig v. County of Allegheny, 32 Pa. 474, 2 A. 2d 842 (1938) (Use of
police power by public authority must be reasonable and not capricious or arbitrary.) ; but see Department of Public Works v. Lanter, 413 Ill. 581, 110 N. E.
2d 179, 183 (1953) ; Note 60 HARv. L. REv. 464 (1947).
28 Compare this construction with that in Supervisors v. U. S. ex relatione,
71 U. S. 435, 446, 18 L. Ed. 419, 423 (1866) ; where Swayne, J., states, "Where
power is given to public officers, in the language of the act before us ["may"]
or in equivalent language-whenever the public interest or individual rights call
for its exercise-the language used, though permissive in form, is in fact peremptory." Which view seems rather general; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 1131
(4th ed. 1951). Compare also ORE. LAWS 1947, c. 226 § 14 ("the commission
shall provide access . . ." [Emphasis supplied.]).
-, See note 19 supra.
20 U. S. v. Miller, 317 U. S. 329 (1942).
(In ascertaining damages it is not
proper to take into account an enhancement in value.); Department of Public
Works v. Thompson, 43 Cal. 2d 13, 271 P. 2d 507 (1954) (compensation for
severance.) ; In Re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 93 Ohio
App. 179, 112 N. E. 2d 411 (1952) (Court here lists elements of establishing
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Thus, in such cases, petitioners are not in the position of parties whose
property rights have been interfered with under the exercise of the
power of taxation or the police power, in which cases there would be
no compensation. Finally, to the petitioners' contentions that the
director did not treat similarly abutters similarly located, the Ohio
court laconically announced that "the mere fact, if it is a fact, that
the director has failed to perform some duties, is no reason for enjoining him from performing other duties that he is undertaking to perform."
This writer submits that the Ohio court by permitting this public
officer to decide for himself what duties to perform and what duties
not to perform, when coupled with his discretion in selecting sites and
otherwise, may well allow him, subject only to expensive and tedious
litigation, to designate by a simple entry in his journal long-established
highways as limited access highways, and then by a majestic stroke
of his pen to strike off the access of the abutting landowners at will;
perhaps because the color of their hair is not pleasing to him, perhaps
because their politics are not pleasing to him. Such is not yet the
prevailing view of "equal protection."
If North Carolina ever sees fit to enact a limited access highway
statute, we would be well advised to avoid such a wholesale grant of
power to the highway department. Peterson, J., dissenting in the
Burnquist case 8' stated the danger succinctly: "the .. .object of the
trunk highway system ... was to get the farmers out of the mud. To
the extent that the commissioner can exercise the power here asserted
he not only can keep them in the mud, but off the highways altogether."
But if the statutory discretion which the Ohio court seems to have
vested in their highway director appears to be overly broad, the North
Carolina situation is even more unwarranted. This writer can find
no authority whatever for the North Carolina highway commissioner
to designate public highways as limited access ways. In fact, the highway department received a negative mandate in 1951 when that legislature expressly refused to pass legislation 2 authorizing limited access
highways. Yet, offering no explanation,83 the North Carolina highway
severance damages as; 1. The fair market value of the property taken, 2. The
reduced value of the residue, to be determined after severance and without deduction for benefits.); Highway Commission v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d
783 (1954) (Methods of apportionment of award for loss of access between
lessor and lessee.) ; Wis L. Rav. 458 (1953) ; See note 7 and 8 supra.

Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N. W. 2d 394, 413 (1945).
H. B. 569, "...an act to provide for the.. . establishment... of limited-access
facilities ... " was introduced in the 1951 North Carolina Legislature, but reported
21
12

unfavorably in the Senate.

"Or, at least, has offered no explanation to this reviewer, who sent to their

General Counsel by registered mail (September 26, 1955; registered no 729,
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department is busily putting limited access signs on many of our newer
highways. 34 Either the highway department is proceeding under a conviction that power to designate limited access highways is implied in
the general grant of powers to that department, a conviction which
hardly seems tenable, when we consider our court's traditional solicitude for individual rights,35 or the North Carolina highway department
is making an attempt to bluff abutters into a belief that they have lost
rights which have, in fact, always been theirs. Let us hope that if these
acts are tested in the courts, as they should be, the commission will
be able to offer convincing evidence of its authority to designate Limited
Access Highways in North Carolina.
HAMILTON C. HORTON, JR.
Torts-Contributory Negligence as a Matter of Law-A Threat to
Stare Decisis
In broad daylight the plaintiff-pedestrian, who had looked both
ways and had seen no vehicle approaching, started across the open
highway and was struck by defendant-motorist eighteen inches from the
other side; the motorist was traveling only twenty to twenty-five miles
per hour and the plaintiff had clear visibility for 700 feet. The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that he
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.' Judge Bobbitt, dissenting, 2 thought that there was more reason for submitting this case
to the jury than there was in the similar case of Williams v. Henderson,3 because more evidence of due care was shown here. The principal
case attempted to distinguish the Williams case, 4 but did not seem to
Chapel Hill.) an inquiry as to the authority under which the Commission was
constructing Limited Access Highways.
"Typical are those erected on the Durham-Chapel Hill highway: "Limited
Access Highway.

Entrance by permit only.

S. H. & P. W. C."

"The Minnesota Court, in Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N. W. 2d
394 (1945), reviews the question of whether statutory authority is necessary
and tabulates those states which are with and those without statutes. That
court found a statute unnecessary, construing the general grant of power to determine what "land" to acquire, to include all interests growing out of land,
including easements of access. The great majority of states, however, obviously
felt a specific statute necessary: e.g., ILLINOIS ANNO. STAT. c. 121 § 334 et seq.
(Supp. 1954); ANNO. LAWS OF MASS. C. 81 § 7c (1953); N. Y. CODE ANNO.
c. 248 § 30.4 (1937); OHio GEN. CODE § 1178-21 (Page 1946); ORE. LAws

c. 226 § 14 (1947).

'Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 2d 589 (1954).
2
Id. at 418, 85 S.E. 2d at 593.
8230 N. C. 707, 55 S.E. 2d 462 (1949). Plaintiff's intestate crossed the open
highway to go to her mail box. As she was standing at the box with her back
to the road two trucks were approaching, the second following the first at a short
distance. The first truck passed and she turned suddenly and walked in front
of the second truck. The court held that intestate was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
'Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 416, 85 S. E. 2d 589, 592: "'Here the
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succeed. In effect, it seems that the Williams case was overruled, or
at least restricted to its own peculiar facts.
In looking at other cases in this area disharmony is also found.a
It seems that the phrase "contributory negligence as a matter of law"
is readily applied to justify opposite results in cases with similar facts.
According to a recent writer, the phrase "explains nothing and succeeds
only in creating an aura of mystery about the entire decision."
defendant was operating his heavily loaded truck at 45 to 50 miles per hour
within 150 feet of the vehicle just ahead. As the road was straight he saw or
should have seen the deceased on the shoulder of the highway, standing at the
mail box before the first truck passed her. She had her back to him and was apparently oblivious to his approach. Yet he did not slacken his speed or apply
his brakes or sound his horn. These circumstances present a case for the jury.'"
One would think that being "oblivious" while crossing a highway would be
contributory negligence as a matter of law; here deceased's oblivion was the
very thing that got plaintiff's case to the jury. It seems, therefore, that the
only way to reconcile the Garnon and Williams cases is to think in terms of
last clear chance for the Williams case.
' The following cases held that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law: Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 2d 589 (1954). Badders v.
Lassiter, 240 N. C. 413, 82 S. E. 2d 357 (1954). Wife of plaintiff stopped at
the intersection as she was coming out of a servient road and after seeing defendant-motorist approaching from her right about a block away she changed to
low gear and went across the intersection at a speed of five miles per hour and
did not again look to her right or hear anything until the impact. Singletary v.
Nixon, 239 N. C. 634, 80 S. E. 2d 676 (1954). Plaintiff's lights and brakes were
adequate when he ran into the defendant truck-trailer as it was backing off the
road into a terminus. Johnson v. Heath, 240 N. C. 255, 81 S. E. 2d 657 (1954).
Plaintiff who had allegedly never seen the mule drove his automobile into same
on a bright moonlight night without slackening his pace or turning to the left
when there was nothing in the left lane to prevent such. Sheldon v. Childers,
240 N. C. 449, 82 S. E. 2d 396 (1954). Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that
he was driving his automobile about 50 miles per hour, following defendant's
tractor-trailer, and when he was about 400 feet to the rear of defendant's vehicle, with a clear view ahead, he blew his horn and turned into the left lane
to pass, and when he was about 200 feet behind the tractor-trailer, it pulled
into the left lane to enter a dirt road on its left and stopped, blocking all but
about two and one-half feet of hard surface on plaintiff's left and about five
feet of hard surface and six feet of shoulder level with the pavement on plaintiff's right over which he could have passed. Plaintiff applied his brakes, and
there were skid marks for 157 feet before his automobile hit the trailer and
stopped.
The following cases held that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a
matter of law: Williams v. Henderson, 230 N. C. 707, 55 S. E. 2d 462 (1949).
Hamilton v. Henry, 239 N. C. 664, 80 S. E. 2d 485 (1954). Plaintiff-motorist,
after looking and seeing no other vehicles, slowed down to twenty miles per
hour as he entered an intersection. After getting inside the intersection he saw
defendant-motorist coming at him to his left about 100 feet away at the rate of
about 50 miles per hour, and the left front of defendant's vehicle crashed into
the left rear of plaintiff's vehicle as plaintiff's vehicle was two-thirds of the way
across the intersection. There was some evidence that just prior to the collision
defendant had been looking out of his side window. (Note the similarity between this case and the Garnon case, and the fact that the plaintiff in the Garmnon
case was almost across the highway.) Goodson v. Williams, 237 N. C. 291, 74
S. E. 2d 762 (1953). Defendant-motorist struck deceased pedestrian just before
deceased had cleared the hard surface on defendant's right. just before the
collision defendant had met another car whose headlights had blinded him, and
defendant did not see deceased until he was about five feet away. Bryant v.
Watford. 240 N. C. 333, 81 S. E. 2d 926 (1954). Defendant stopped his truck
on the highway at night witnout lights and plaintiff-motorist ran into back of the
truck.Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 138, 142 (1954).
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Courts have no trouble with the general rule, for that is established
beyond doubt.7 The real problem of the court is determined whether
or not more than one reasonable inference as to negligence may be
drawn from the facts. Courts in any jurisdiction that still retains contributory negligence as a defense have trouble at this point ;8 whereas,
jurisdictions that have comparative negligence have no such problem.9
The "reasonable deductions" or "reasonable inferences" that may be
drawn from a given set of facts will naturally vary, for such reasoning
is subjective in nature-although the objective "reasonable man" is the
ultimate criterion. It would take one with divine omniscience to explain
why a certain inference is the only permissible one the "reasonable
man" would draw in a given case. Split decisions in this area indicate
that judges disagree as to when only one inference may be drawn.' 0
"65 C. J. S. § 251 (3) at 1126; DEERING, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 12 (1886)
BARROWs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, 35 (1900) : "Nor should the

court withdraw the case from the jury for the reason that to its mind the facts
were so weak as to give no support to the proposition of negligence, either of
plaintiff or defendant. The question is, rather, are the facts so weak in the estimate of fair, sound minds, that the law would not tolerate a verdict founded
upon them. If but one inference can be drawn from the evidence, it, is, of
course, purely a question of law for the decision of the court." SAL2,MoND, THE
Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 2d 589
LAW OF TORTS 38 (1924).
(1954). Bartek v. Grossman, 365 Pa. 522, 52 A. 2d 209 (1947). Sargent v.
Williams, 152 Tex. 413, 258 S. W. 2d 787 (1953).
' Bartek v. Grossman, 365 Pa. 522, 52 A. 2d 209 (1947), commented on in
Note, 21 TEmp. L. Q. 66 (1947). Prospective lessee followed defendant's agent
into a dark room to inspect the house he was thinking about renting and fell
into a trap door, held, contributory negligence as a matter of law. Gills v. New
York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 342 Ill. 455, 174 N. E. 523 (1930), commented on in
Note, 26 ILL. L. REv. 453 (1931). Plaintiff-motorist waited for the eastward
train to pass, and then proceeded across the tracks where he was struck by a
westward train along the outer track which train had given no warning, held,
no contributory negligence as a matter of law: since where there is any evidence
which tends to show the use of due care, the question of contributory ngligence
is one for the jury. Sargent v. Williams, 152 Tex. 413, 258 S. W. 2d 787
(1953), commented on in Notes, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 391 (1954) and 32 TEx. L.
REv. 469 (1954). Two girls, aged 13 and 14, voluntarily rode with a 13 year
old boy, who drove 110 miles per hour, and who had a reputation for recklessness, held, the girls were contributorily negligent as a matter of law. See strong
dissent. 152 Tex. 413, 422, 258 S. W. 2d 787, 791.
'Jurisdictions that have abolished contributory negligence as a defense and
now have comparative negligence simply submit the case to the jury, in every
instance, and let the jury determine what percentage of the total damage was
attributable to the negligence of the respective litigants. See Note, 24 N. Z. L. J.
300 (1948). For a suggested comparative negligence law for North Carolina
see: Proposals for Legislation in North Carolina 11 N. C. L. REV. 51, 52, 59
(1932). Such a statute has been introduced a number of times before the North
Carolina General Assembly, the last time being in 1953, and has always been
defeated.
o The following are some of the recent split-decisions: Garmon v. Thomas,
241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 589 (1954) ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N. C. 392. 53 S. E.
2d 251 (1949) ; McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator Co., 230 N. C. 539, 54 S. E. 2d
45 (1949) ; Powell v. Lloyd, 234 N. C. 481, 67 S. E. 2d 664 (1951) ; Badders v.
Lassiter, 240 N. C. 413, 82 S. E. 2d 357 (1954) ; Singletary v. Nixon, 239 N. C.
634, 80 S. E. 2d 676 (1954); Beck v. Hooks, 218 N. C. 105, 10 S. E. 2d 608
(1940); Bartek v. Grossman, 365 Pa. 522, 52 A. 2d 209 (1947); Sargent v.
Williams, 152 Tex. 413, 258 S. W. 2d 787 (1953).
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At one time the court would automatically declare plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law when he "outran his headlights."'" This was called the "mathematical rule" or "mathematical
formula."'1 2 In effect, the "mathematical rule" said that contributory
negligence is the only inference that may be drawn where plaintiff
"outran his headlights." There was opposition to the "rule" in the
courts,1 3 and writers were critical of it. 1 4 In 1953 the General Assembly saw fit to abolish the "mathematical rule" by amending G. S.
§ 20-141.1r
The "mathematical rule" as applied to "outrunning headlights"
cases was commendable in that litigants would know what the court
would hold once it was established that plaintiff had been "outrunning
his headlights." But the obvious fallacy to such a rule is that there
may be "outrunning headlights" situations in which the plaintiff is not
guilty of contributory negligence. Such being true, the "rule" clearly
violates the single inference idea. By nature, then, it seems that the
rule of "contributory negligence as a matter of law" defies any such
restrictions as the "mathematical formula."
Failure to yield the right of way on the open highway has been held
not to be contributory negligence per se, 16 and contributory negligence
of the pedestrian is not presumed from the mere fact that he is killed.' 7
Therefore, it seems that anything like the "mathematical rule" is excluded from this area.
Rules such as the "mathematical formula" have been applied to
other areas. In the famous case of Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Good1
Beck v. Hooks, 218 N. C. 105, 10 S. E. 2d 608 (1940). See also Tyson
v. Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 47 S. E. 2d 251 (1948); Cox v. Lee, 230 N. C. 155, 52
S. E. 2d 355 (1949); and Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N. C. 377, 64 S. E. 2d 276
(1951).
1
Notes, 27 N. C. L. REv. 153 (1948) and 31 N. C. L. Rxv. 412, 415 (1953).
Beck v. Hooks, 218 N. C. 105, 115, 116, 10 S. E. 2d 608, 614 (1940). Clarkson, J. (dissenting), joined by Seawell and Devin, J. J., said: "It was not the intention of the court that this case should depart from the rule of reasonable pru1"

dence and substitute for it a mathematical form. . . . The practice of making out
a case against the plaintiff on his evidence taken as a whole is unwarranted in an
appellate court, necessarily involving a consideration of the weight of testimony.
For the same reason it is even worse to make out a case against him upon the
defendant's evidence, however uncontradicted."
14 See note 12 supra.
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141 subsection (e)
was amended to provide, "that
the failure or inability of a motor vehicle operator who is operating such vehicle
within the maximum speed limits prescribed by G. S. § 20-141 (b) to stop such
vehicle within the radius of the lights thereof or within the range of his vision
shall not be considered negligence per se or contributory negligence per se in any
civil action, but the facts relating thereto may be considered with other facts
in determining the negligence or contributory negligence of such operator." See
Gantt v. Hobson, 240 N. C. 426, 82 S. E. 2d 384 (1954) where inability of
motorist to stop within the radius of his lights was held not to be insulating
negligence.
" Simpson v. Curry, 237 N. C. 260, 74 S. E. 2d 649 (1953).
1 'Goodson
v. Williams, 237 N. C. 291, 74 S. E. 2d 485 (1953).
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man,' 8

Justice Holmes delivering the opinion, it was decided that before crossing a railroad track the motorist must stop, look, listen and
get out of vehicle if necessary. Six years later Pokora v. Wabash Ry
overruled the Goodman case, Justice Cardozo saying:
"If the driver leaves his vehicle when he nears a cut or curve,
he will learn nothing by getting out about the perils that lurk
beyond. By the time he regains his seat and sets his car in
motion, the hidden train may be upon him."'u
The opinion criticized "rules artificially developed, and imposed from
without." 20 The 1937 General Assembly of North Carolina-no doubt
with the Pokora case in mind-passed two statutes which provided that
failure of the motorist to stop at railroad crossings 21 or to stop before
entering a main highway from a servient road 22 is not to be considered
contributory negligence per se. 22 In view of those two statutes and
the recent amendment to G. S. § 20-141, the North Carolina courts
should be less prone-to nonsuit plaintiffs on the ground of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
There is no simple solution to the problem. As long as we retain
the rule that certain cases are to be resolved by the court pursuant
to the single inference idea we are going to have close decisions, frustrated litigants, and sometimes actual violations of the jury's prerogative-not to mention irreconcilable cases. One solution might be the
General Assembly's passage of a comparative negligence law, in which
event negligence would always be a jury question. 24 At least we would
have stare decisis unencumbered in that every case would go to the
jury.
As the rule of contributory negligence as a matter of law remains
in use we may as well reconcile ourselves to inconsistent and irreconcilable cases. 25 At present it seems that the only thing that we can
-8275 U. S. 66 (1927). See Note, 43 HARV. L. Rav. 926 (1930).
10

292 U. S. 98, 104 (1933).

-01d. at 105 (after giving illustrations of hazards involved in leaving the

vehicle to observe the track) : "Illustrations such as these bear witness to the
need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law.
The need is more urgent when there is no background of experience out of which
the standards have emerged. They are then, not the natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially developed, and imposed from
without."
'IN.
C. GEN. STAT. § 20-143.
22
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-158.
Nonsuit of the plaintiff for failure to stop before entering a main road is
proper if plaintiff is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Badders v.
Lassiter, 240 N. C. 413, 82 S.E. 2d 357 (1954).
" Note, 24 N. Z. L. J. 300 (1948) and Proposals for Legislation in. North
Carolina
11 N. C. L. REv. 51, 52 (1932).
2
Those who dislike the confinement of consistency may find consoling this

quotation from Ralph Waldo Emerson: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin
of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.

With
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do is rest each case upon its own peculiar facts and hope that a more
consistent policy will develop.26
GERALD CORBETT PARKER

Torts-Contributory Negligence-Standard of Care Required of Persons under Physical Disability
In the principal case1 the plaintiff, a 76-year-old blind man, was
suing for injuries sustained when he slipped and fell on the unfinished
curbing of a street being repaired in the city of Winston-Salem. The
trial court granted a nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence
because the plaintiff knew that the road was being repaired and was
thus under notice of its dangerous condition. On appeal before the
supreme court the nonsuit was affirmed.
The plaintiff in this case was nonsuited because he failed to use
due care. Just what the words due care mean in regard to any given
set of circumstances is often difficult to determine. The interpretation
becomes even more difficult when applied to circumstances involving
a person under physical disability. However, the court states in its
opinion that due care is "that standard of care which the law has
established for everybody." 2
In regard to standard of care the Restatement of Torts has this
to say:
"Unless the plaintiff is a child or an insane person, the standard
of conduct to which he should conform is the standard to which
a reasonable man would conform under like circumstances.",,
One widely accepted authority in the field of torts gives this insight
into the problem:
"The standard required of an individual is that of the supposed conduct, under similar circumstances, of a hypothetical
person, the reasonable man of ordinary prudence, who repreconsistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern
himself with his shadow on the wall." THE WoRxs OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON
58 (E. E. Emerson ed. 1883).
28Decisions,

14 BROOxLYN L. REv. 137, 140 (1947).

Cole v. Koonce, 214
C. L. REv.

N. C. 188, 191, 198 S. E. 637, 638 (1938), cited in Note, 29 N.
301, 305 (1951) in passing upon the conduct of the plaintiff and
by the exercise of due care, to avoid the consequences of defendant's
the court said: "where the factors of decisions are numerous and
...and estimates of witnesses play a prominent part.., practically
must 'stand on its own bottom."'
' Cook v. Winston-Salem, 241 N. C. 422, 85 S. E. 2d 696 (1954).
2
Id. at 431, 85 S.E. 2d at 702.
3
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, § 464 (1)

(1934).

his ability,
negligence,
complicated
every case
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sents the community ideal of reasonable behavior.
teristics of this imaginary person include:

The charac-

a. The physical attributes of the actor himself.
b. Normal intelligence and mental capacity.
c. Normal perception and memory, and a minimum of experience
and information, common to all in the community.
d. Such superior skill and knowledge as the actor has, or holds
'4
himself out as having, when he undertakes to act."
Corpus Juris Secundum summarizes the situation in the following
language:
"A person under any physical disability is required to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury, and, if he fails to-do so and
such failure contributes proximately to the injury, he is guilty
of contributory negligence. .

.

. Ordinary care in the case of

such a person is such care as an ordinarily prudent person with
a like infirmity would have exercised under the same or similar
circumstances." 5
American Jurisprudence states:
"There is no higher or different standard of care for one who
is aged, feeble, blind, halt, deaf, or otherwise than for one in
perfect physical condition." 6
The few authorities quoted above serve only to show the wide
divergence of legal thought in regard to the standard of care required
of a person under a physical disability. The terms due care, ordinary
care, the standard of a reasonable man under similar circumstances,
and a standard of care no different from that of one in perfect physical
condition are attempts to formulate an objective standard for instructions to juries by which they may be guided; however, the differences
in the use of language may tend to confuse rather than to clarify any
attempt at an understanding of the standard required.
However, a brief look at some of the decided cases may shed further
7
light upon the problem. The problem has arisen in regard to the blind,
the deaf,8 the lame,' the intoxicated,'0 and others."
'PROSsER, TORTS, § 31, p. 124 (1955).
See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 289
and comments (1934).
'65 C. J. S. § 142, p. 782.
138 Am. JuR. § 210, p. 895.
7 Balcom v. City of Independence, 178 Iowa 685, 160 N. W. 305 (1916) ; Hill
v. City of Glenwood, 124 Iowa 479, 100 N. W. 522 (1904); Keith v. Worcester
R. R., 196 Mass. 478, 82 N. E. 680 (1907) ; Weinstein v. Wheeler, 127 Ore. 406,
257 Pac. 20 (1928); Smith v. Sneller, 345 Pa. 68, 26 A. 2d 452 (1942); Flynn
v. Pittsburgh R. R., 234 Pa. 335, 83 Atl. 207 (1912). See note: 141 A. L. R. 718.
' Smith's Administrator v. Railway Co., 146 Ky. 568, 142 S. W. 1047 (1912) ;
Jadubiec v. Hasty, 337 Mich. 205, 59 N. W. 2d 385 (1953) ; Mitchell v. Seaboard
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First of all, the fact that a person is blind, deaf, or otherwise disabled does not make it negligence for him to be upon the public streets.
This seems to be the law generally 2 as well as in North Carolina.13
In many cases the standard of care applied by the courts has been
the care of an ordinarily careful and prudent person having a like
defect.' 4 For example, in a Georgia case involving a deaf plaintiff
who was struck by a streetcar, the court stated that the fact that the
plaintiff was deaf "did not imply that he was required to exercise only
that care which a prudent man who could hear would use, but which
a prudent man in the same condition as to impairment of his hearing
would exercise."u 5 It may be pointed out that the above standard was
that of the ordinary deaf person (or of the ordinary blind person, or

of the ordinary lame person).
Ordinary care has been the standard applied by many courts, probably on the basis that they feel that the test should be the same for all
sane adults. In Toledo, P. & W. R. R. v. Hanmnett, the trial court's

instruction that the plaintiff was "bound to use that degree of care which
an ordinarily prudent person whose hearing was so defective should
have used under the circumstances

. .

." was reversed by the appellate

court.'" The Illinois court said: "That degree or kind of care required
to be used must be the same in the case of all adult persons in possession
of their natural senses,-that is, that it should be reasonable and ordinary care. It cannot rest upon a sliding scale, depending upon the acuteness of or defects in the senses of sight, hearing, or feeling."' 7
However, many courts have held that a defect in one of the senses
imposes the necessity of greater care upon the use of the remaining
Airline R. R., 153 N. C. 116, 68 S. E. 1059 (1910); McCann v. Sadowski, 287
Pa. 294, 135 Atl. 207 (1927). See Note, 17 U. OF DETOIT L. J. 105 (1953).

' Denver v. Willson, 81 Colo. 134, 254 Pac. 153 (1927) ; Bianchetti v. Luce, 222
Mo. App. 282, 2 S. W. 2d 129 (1928) ; Payne v. West Chester, 273 Pa. 570, 117
Atl. 335 (1922).
10 Straughn's Adm'r v. Fendly, 301 Ky. 209, 191 S. W. 2d 391 (1945)
; Epellett
v. Sault Ste. Marie, 144 Mich. 392, 108 N. W. 360 (1906); McMichael v. Pennsylvania
R. R_, 331 Pa. 584, 1 A. 2d 242 (1938).
"1Wray v. Fairfield Amusement Co., 126 Conn. 221, 10 A. 2d 600 (1940)
(bone condition) ; Mahan v. State to Use of Carr, 172 Md. 373, 191 Atd. 575
(1937) (short stature); Edwards v. Three River, 102 Mich. 153; 60 N. W. 454
(1894) (deceased condition) ; Singletary v. A. C. L. R. R., 217 S. C. 212, 60 S. E.
2d 305 (1950) (dwarf); Eleason v. N. Y. Ry., 254 Wis. 134, 35 N. W. 2d 301
(1948) (epileptic fits).
12 Neff v. Wellesley, 148 Mass. 487, 20 N. E. 111 (1889) ; Weinstein v. Wheeler, 127 Ore. 406, 257 Pac. 20 (1928).
13 Cook v. Winston-Salem,
241 N. C. 422, 85 S. E. 2d 696 (1954); Foy v.
Winston, 126 N. C. 381, 35 S. E. 609 (1900).
" Jones v. Bayley, 49 Cal. App. 2d 567, 122 P. 2d 293 (1942) ; Kerr v. Connecticut Co., 107 Conn. 304, 104 Atl. 751 (1928) ; Trumbley v. Moore, 151 Neb.
780, 39 N. W. 2d 613 (1949).
" Atlanta Consol. Street Ry. v. Bates, 103 Ga. 333, 350, 30 S. E. 41, 49 (1897).
18220 Ill. 9, 13, 77 N. E. 72, 74 (1906).
17 Id. at 13, 77 N. E. at 74.
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senses.' s In an early Massachusetts decision, the court said that "if
the plaintiff was a person of poor sight, common prudence required of
her greater care in walking upon the streets, and avoiding obstructions,
than is required of persons of good sight."19
The North Carolina court in the principal case, following Foy v.
Winston,20 seemed to agree with this theory. It is clear that the word
"care" as used by the Massachusetts and North Carolina courts refers to
the particular plaintiff's effort or diligence or care and not to the standard of care. In the Cook case the court avoids any possible confusion by
using the word "effort" as follows: "Plaintiff's evidence compels the
conclusion that he, a blind man, failed to put forth a greater degree
of effort than one not acting under any disabilities to attain due care
for his own safety: that standard of care which the law has established
for everybody.

. .

. Such a failure to use due care for his own safety

was a proximate contributing cause of his injuries. 12 '
It is submitted that this statement of the North Carolina Supreme
Court leads to a clearer understanding of the standard of care required
of persons under physical disability and, if followed generally, would
remove much of the existing confusion.
DONALD LEON MOORE

Torts-Negligence-Injuries to Elevator Passengers
In a recent case the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a
nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff, an elevator passenger, was
guilty of contributory negligence.' In this case the court, by implication, followed the rulings of previous North Carolina decisions that
the owner of an elevator owes a passenger riding thereon that degree
of care exercised by the ordinary prudent man under the circumstances.? Various jurisdictions have used different approaches in determining the protection to be afforded passengers on elevators in terms
of the duties owed by manufacturers and those under contracts to
mlaintain, as well as owners.
"Hill v. City of Glenwood, 14 Iowa 479, 100 N. W. 522 (1904); Winn v.

1

Lowell, 1 Allen 177 (Mass., 1861); Farm v. North Carolina R. R., 155 N. C.
136, 71 S. E. 81 (1911).
" Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen 177, 180 (Mass., 1861).
126 N. C. 381, 35 S. E. 609 (1900).
" Cook v. Winston-Salem, 241 N. C. 422, 431, 85 S. E. 2d 696, 702 (1954).

.

1

Waldrup v. Garver, 240 N. C. 649, 83 S. E. 2d 663 (1954).

The North

Carolina court held that where the plaintiff's evidence showed that the tenant
of a building failed to use lighting facilities provided by the owner of the building, opened an elevator, and stepped into an open shaft, a nonsuit was proper
as contributory negligence was shown in the plaintiff's evidence. The court
implied, however, that the defendant building owner owed his tenant the ordinary
degree
of care.
2
Ramsey v. Nash Furniture Co., 209 N. C. 165, 183 S. E. 536 (1936) ; Hood
v. Mitchell, 206 N. C. 156, 173 S. . 61 (1934); Scott v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 198 N. C. 795, 153 S. E. 413 (1930).
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Some courts have ruled with North Carolina in refusing to afford
special protection to elevator passengers with respect to the duty owed
by elevator owners. On the other hand, others have felt that passengers on elevators should be afforded special protection in terms of the
4
liability of owners and have held owners to the highest degree of care.
Those jurisdictions, including North Carolina, which hold the duty
of owners to be that of ordinary care, base their decisions on the propositions that (1) elevator owners are not servants of the public6 and
(2) they are not under enforceable obligations to receive passengers.0
As practical matters, these reasons are not too cogent, for elevator
owners, especially department stores and hotels, do offer their facili3
District of Columbia: Woodward and Lothrop v. Lineberry, 60 App. D. C.
164, 50 Fed. 2d 314 (1913); Iowa: Johnson v. Lincoln Hotel Co., 189 Iowa 29,
177 N. W. 550 (1920) ; Massachusetts: Seaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass. 39, 60 N. E.
795 (1901); Michigan: Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich. 204, 96 N. W. 29 (1903);
Missouri: Phegley v. Graham, 358 Mo. 551, 215 S. W. 2d 499 (1948). In this
case the court stated that the defendant building owner owed the ordinary degree
of care, and that he could not delegate this duty. Kennedy v. Phillips, 319 Mo.
573, 5 S. W. 2d 33 (1928); Cox v. Bondurant, 220 Mo. App. 948, 7 S. W. 2d
403 (1925); Montana: Chicas v. Foley Bros. Grocery Co., 73 Mont. 575, 236
Pac. 361 (1925); New Jersey: McCracken v. Myers, 75 N. J. L. 935, 68 At.
805 (1908) ; New York: Cohen v. Sun Ins. Office, 198 N. Y. 177, 91 N. E. 263
(1910). The court in this case stated that a landlord cannot delegate his duty
to use reasonable care in the operation of his elevator so as to relieve himself of
liability. Rhode Island: Edward v. Manufacturer's Building Co., 27 R. I. 428,
61 Atl. 646 (1905); Texas: Martin Inc. Co. v. Trevey, 8 S. W. 2d 527 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928) ; Washington: Myers v. Little Church by the Side of the Road,
37 Wash. 2d 897, 227 P. 2d 165 (1951). Here the court ruled that a master
owes his servant the duty of supplying a reasonably safe place of work, and
that this duty is non-delegable. West Virginia: Brown v. De Marie, 131 W. Va.
264, 46 S. E. 2d 797 (1948).
"Alabama: Ensley Holding Co. v. Kelly, 229 Ala. 650, 158 So. 896 (1934);
Morgan v. Saks, 43 Ala. 139, 38 So. 848 (1905). In this case the court held
that the defendant was bound to use the highest degree of care while the plaintiff was entering the elevator as well as while he was in it. California: Champagne
v. A. Hamburger and Sons, Inc., 169 Cal. 683, 147 Pac. 954 (1915); Treadwell
v. Whitier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 266 (1889); Illinois: Carson v. Weston Hotel
Corp., 351 Ill. App. 53, 115 N. E. 2d 800 (1953). Here the court stated the rule
as requiring extraordinary care and diligence on the part of the owner. Hefferman v. Mandel Bros., 297 Ill. App. 272, 17 N. E. 2d 523 (1938); Indiana:
Tippecanoe Loan and Trust Co. v. Jester, 180 Ind. 357, 101 N. E. 915 (1913) ;
Kentucky: Kentucky Hotel Corp. v. Camp, 97 Ky. 424, 30 S. W. 1010 (1895);
Minnesota: Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207, 42 N. W. 873 (1889); Missouri:
Hensler v. Stix, 113 Mo. App. 566, 88 S. W. 108 (1905); Nebraska: Grimmel v.
Boyd, 94 Neb. 240, 142 N. W. 893 (1913); Nevada: Smith v. Odd Fellows Bldg.
Ass'n, 46 Nev. 48, 205 Pac. 796 (1922); Pennsylvania: McKnight v. S. S. Kresge
Co., 285 Pa. 489, 135 Atl. 575 (1926); Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 57 Atl.
356 (1904); Virginia: Murphy's Hotel, Inc. v. Cuddy's Adm'r, 124 Va. 207, 97
S. E. 794 (1919); Wisconsin: Dibbert v. Metropolitan Inv. Co., 158 Wis. 69,
147 N. W. 3 (1914). In all of the above cases the owners of elevators were
characterized as common carriers. Oregon: Kelly v. Lewis Inv. Co., 66 Ore 1,
133 Pac. 826 (1913). In this case elevator owners were classified as carriers
for hire rather than common carriers. Texas: O'Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exchange, 153 S. W. 2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). Here the defendant was held
to the highest degree of care, even though the court refused to hold that he was
a common carrier.
'Edwards v. Manufacturers Bldg. Co., 27 R. I. 248, 61 Atl. 646 (1905).
6 Seaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass. 329, 60 N. E. 795 (1901).
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ties for use by the general public. On the other hand, courts affording
passengers special protection put forward excellent reasons for their
decisions. They point to the fact that an elevator passenger is in a
completely helpless condition-moving either up or down in a machine
over which he has no control, and in which he is unable to protect
himself from serious injury or death. 7 Other factors alluded to as good
reasons for affording passengers special protection are the owner's
knowledge that his facilities will be used by the public, and his derivation of profit from the maintenance of elevators.8
Although North Carolina has refused to grant passengers special
protection in terms of owners' liability, it has afforded them some aid
in suits against one under a contract to maintain the elevators in a
safe condition by labeling elevators "dangerous instrumentalities."
This label enables persons injured in elevator accidents to recover in
actions against persons contracting to maintain elevators, even though
plaintiffs in such actions are not parties to the contracts. Several other
jurisdictions are in accord with North Carolina on this point.10 Still
others have reached the same result without describing elevators as
"dangerous instrumentalities."-"
Those courts finding such a duty
point out that where elevators are defective, serious injuries or death
is likely to result, and that such results are traceable to failures on the
part of the contractor to fulfill his contractual obligation to keep in
repair. A few jurisdictions have held that one under a contract to
maintain owes no duty to passengers because they are not parties to the
contract. However, these cases are either old ones,' 2 or ones in which
the defect is chargeable to someone other than the contractor. 13
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has not directly passed upon
the protection to be afforded passengers in terms of the duty owed by
Treadwell
80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 66 (1889).
' Champagnev.v.Whitier,
A. Hamburger
and Sons, Inc., 169 Cal. 683, 147 Pac. 954
(1915); Hefferman v. Mandel Bros., 297 Ill. App. 272, 17 N. E. 2d 523 (1938).
In these cases the courts pointed out that elevator owners, especially department
stores and hotels, provide their facilities in order to increase patronage.
'Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N. C. 285, 56 S. E. 2d 684 (1949). Here
the court was applying Virginia substantive law. Actually the court stated that
an elevator is not an inherently dangerous instrumentality, but that it may become
one by the defendant's work on it.
"0Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P. 2d 1013 (1932) ; Berg v.
Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 318, 231 Pac. 832 (1924).
" Carson v. Weston Hotel Corp., 342 Ill. App. 602, 97 N. E. 2d 620 (1951);
Dobson v. Otis Elevator Co., 324 Mo. 1147, 26 S. W. 2d 942 (1930). In these
cases the courts held the defendants liable on the ground that one who supplies
a thing for such use by others where it is obvious that any defect will be likely
to result in injury to those so using it, is liable to any person who, using it properly for the purpose for which it was intended, is injured by its defective condition.
" Simmons v. Gregory, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 509, 85 S. E. 751 (1905).
"zMcDonald v. Haughton Elevator and Machine Co., 60 Ohio App. 185, 20
N. E. 2d 253 (1938).
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elevator manufacturers. In most cases the manufacturers contract
with the owners to maintain the elevator in a safe condition, and suits
are brought against manufacturers for failure to maintain and not on
the grounds of negligent manufacturing. Most jurisdictions that have
determined the duty of manufacturers have preferred to protect the
passenger by finding a duty of ordinary care owed to members of the
public although there is no privity of contract between the defendant
manufacturer and the complaining passenger.14 Only one case has
flatly refused to find such an obligation,' 5 and the court deciding it
failed to give any reasons for so holding.
Regardless of their approach with regard to the duty owed, whether
by manufacturers, contractors to maintain or owners, a number of
the courts have enabled complaining passengers to withstand nonsuits,
even though they fail to prove any specific negligence on the part of
the defendants, by the use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.'0 One court
has disagreed with this view for technical reasons, 17 but policy, at least,
seems to be on the side of the courts accepting this view. As a practical matter, it is almost impossible to prove what specific negligence
was the cause of an elevator accident, even though such accidents are
not likely to occur without negligence on someone's part.
Some courts have further aided injured elevator passengers by
stating that passengers can rely on the safety devices with which elevators are equipped,'1 8 thus limiting the availability of the defense of
contributory negligence as a bar to their action.
Throughout the cases affording passengers protection runs a cogent
line of reasoning, as follows:
1. Elevator passengers are in a completely helpless position.
" Buteman v. Doughnut Corp., 63 Cal. App. 2d 711, 147 P. 2d 404 (1944). In
this case the court ruled that, as the defendant was the manufacturer of an inherently dangerous instrumentality, he owed a duty to the plaintiff even though
there was no privity of contract between the defendant and the plaintiff. Dahms
v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P. 2d 1013 (1932).
" McDonald v. Haughton Elevator and Machine Co., 60 Ohio App. 185, 20
N. E. 2d 253 (1938).
"8Illinois: Carson v. Weston Hotel Corp., 351 Ill. App. 523, 115 N. E. 2d
800 (1953); Hefferman v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 297 Ill. App. 272, 17 N. E. 2d
523 (1938); North Carolina: MdIntyre v. Monarch Elevator and Machine Co.,
230 N. C. 539, 53 S. E. 2d 528 (1949) ; Stewart v. Carpet Co., 138 N. C. 60, 50
S. E. 562 (1905) ; Pennsylvania: McKnight v. S. S. Kresge Co., 285 Pa. 489,
132 Atl. 575 (1926) ; Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 57 At. 356 (1904) ; Wisconsin,: Dibbert v. Metropolitan Inv. Co., 158 Wis. 69, 147 N. W. 3 (1914).
"Feinberg v. Hotel Olmsted Co., 152 Ohio St. 417, 89 N. E. 2d 569 (1949).
The court here refused to apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to an elevator
injury where the machine was a self-service elevator on the grounds that it was
not within the exclusive control of the defendant.
" Morgan v. Saks, 43 Ala. 139, 38 So. 848 (1905); Hood v. Mitchell, 206
N. C. 156, 173 S. E. 61 (1934); Garret v. Eugene Medical Center, 190 Ore.
117, 224 P. 2d 563 (1950).
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2. Owners, contractors to maintain, and manufacturers provide their
services for profit.
3. The defects which result in injury are traceable to some dereliction in duty on the part of either the owner, the one under a contract
to maintain or the manufacturer.
4. The specific negligence causing the accident is hard to determine
and prove.
5. Where one of two parties has to suffer, the law will cast liability
on the one who made the injury possible who, in these cases, happens
to be either the owner, the contractor, or the manufacturer.
HENRY L. FOWLER, JR.
Torts-Nuisance-Wild Animals
The North Carolina Supreme Court was recently faced with a most
interesting and unique case arising out of a dispute between adjoining
landowners culminating in an action founded on a theory of nuisance.'
The defendant in this case constructed on his farm in Richmond County
an artificial pond of about three and one half acres at a point within 400
feet of the neighboring plaintiff's farm. During the winter of 1951-52
the defendant placed lame wild geese on his pond and baited the surrounding area of the pond with food, thus attracting large numbers
of migrating geese, southward bound in search of comfortable winter
quarters. Between the months of October 1951 and June 1952 approximately 200 wild geese nestled by the defendant's pond and from
there foraged on the plaintiff's corn field destroying about one and one
half acres of corn with a market value of $48.00. The next winter the
migrating flock returned, but increased in numbers, and 1200 geese fed
on $105.00 worth of the plaintiff's corn. During the winter of 1953-54
the geese returned for the third time, 3000 strong, and consumed 400
bushels of the plaintiff's wheat ($1,036), seven acres of pasture grass
($100), 140 bushels of barley ($154), and 75 bushels of oats ($52),
causing the plaintiff damages totalling some $1,343.00 for the year.
The defendant, demurring, answered that the complaint failed to
allege any duty owed the plaintiff to protect his property from wild
geese, or that the defendant was negligent in this respect, or in any
respect proximately causing the plaintiff's injury; and that since plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant in any way owned, possessed or
controlled the wild geese, he could not be liable for the trespasses of
animals which are ferae naturae.
The supreme court, overruling the trial court, held that the plaintiff had stated a good cause of action. The court pointed to the fact
1 Andrews v. Andrews,
242 N. C. 382, 88 S. E. 2d 88, (1955).
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that the complaint alleged that the defendant knew that it was the
nature of wild geese to collect during the winter season at such favorable
havens as the defendant's pond, to feed on the surrounding countryside,
and to return to the same location in succeeding years accompanied by
their offspring and other geese so long as the shelter and lame decoys
were maintained by the defendant.
The court had difficulty finding North Carolina precedent, or for
that matter any cases in point, and relied on garden-variety nuisance
decisions grounded on facts showing interference with the enjoyment
of land by neighboring commercial or industrial enterprises. 2 In this
connection, the court noted that negligence was not an indispensable
element of nuisance, and recited the often repeated Latin maxim which
seems to lurk in the background of nuisance actions: "Sic utere tuo it
alienum non laedas (to use your own so that you do not injure another)

."

The majority opinion, written by Justice Higgins, characterized the
plaintiff's cause of action as a private nuisance per accidens (depending
on the circumstances of the interference in relation to the surrounding
conditions) as distinguished from a private nuisance per se (unlawful
interference regardless of location or surroundings). The court evidently found the circumstances of the interference sufficiently compelling
to warrant plaintiff's cause of action, even without clear legal precedent to guide it. Noting the perilous position of the plaintiff, they
suggested that, "at the same rate of increase 7,500 will be there this
year and 20,000 next. If there is no relief for the plaintiff as of the
date suit was brought, there will be none next year. Surely the arm
of the law is neither too short nor too weak to reach out to the pond
and take away the wild geese maintained as prisoners there to attract
'4
their kind in ever increasing numbers."
Justice Parker, in a dissenting opinion, concurred completely with
defendant's contention that there can be no liability for the trespass
of wild geese which are not owned or reduced to possession by the
defendant. On this point the dissent cited a Federal Tort Claims action
by private landowners against the United States for the negligence
of its employees in the operation of its game reserve for migratory
waterfowl, Canadian geese. The court there denied recovery, holding
that a person cannot be held liable on a theory of negligence for the
trespasses of animals ferae naturae which exist free in nature.
'Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N. C. 185, 77 S. E. 2d 682 (1953);

Holton v. Northwestern Oil Co., 201 N. C. 744, 161 S. E. 391 (1931).
' Andrews v. Andrews, 242 N. C. 382, 389, 88 S. E. 2d 88, 92 (1955).
'Id. at 388, 88 S. E. 2d at 92.
' Sickman v. United States, 184 F. 2d 616 (1950), cert. denied 341 U. S. 939
(1951).
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The purpose here is to determine the legal rationale on which the
majority of the court based its conclusion in support of the plaintiff's
cause, apart from the general maxims of tort liability in nuisance, and
to explain, if possible, the diametrically opposed theory of the dissent.
Without a case in point, law by analogy is particularly difficult in the
area of private nuisance for the reason suggested by Professor Prosser
that "there is no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that
which surrounds the word 'nuisance'. . . . [It] is incapable of any
exact or comprehensive definition."0 He attributes the causes for the
uncertainty and confusion to the fact that "nuisance is a field of tortious
conduct. It has reference to the interests invaded, and not to any
particular kind of conduct which has led to the invasion. The attempt
frequently made to distinguish between nuisance and negligence, for
example, is based on a mistaken emphasis upon what the defendant
has done rather than the result which has followed, and overlooks the
well established fact that negligence is merely one type of conduct which
may give rise to a nuisance. The same is true as to the attempted distinction between nuisance and strict liability for abnormal activities,
which has plagued the English as well as the American courts. ' 7 Caught
in the very middle of the "muddied waters" of the law of nuisance is
the question of liability that might be imposed on landowners for the
damage caused by wild animals naturally found on the land or introduced and nurtured there by the owner.
Since there seems to be-little American case authority on this problem, reference must necessarily be made to the reported English dcisions and the editorial comments thereon. In the very early case
of Boulston v. Hardy,8 the defendant made coney-boroughs (rabbit
nests or pens) on his land to protect the conies which he placed in
the boroughs. They increased bountifully under the landowner's care
and then devastated his neighbor's crops. The court held that the
neighbors could not have an action on the case against him because as
soon as the conies came on the plaintiff's land he might kill them, for
they were ferae naturae since merely placing the conies in boroughs
did not bring them into possession, so to create a property right. "This
cause is not like to the cases put, on the other side, of erecting a limekiln, dye-house, or the like; for there the annoyance is by the act of
the parties who make them; but it is not so here, for the conies of
themselves went into the plaintiff's land, and he might take them when
they came upon his land, and make profit of them." 9 The court was
I PROssER, TORTS § 70, p. 389 (2d ed. 1955).
7Id. at § 70 at p. 391.
' 5 Co. Rep. 104 b. Also reported as Bowlston v. Hardy, Cro. Eliz. 547, 78
Eng. Rep. 794 (Q. B. 1597).
"Ibid.
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clearly grappling with the very issues discussed in the majority and
dissenting opinions of our present case.
In Farrer v. Nelson,'0 the defendants were lessees of the shooting
rights over the estate of which the plaintiff's farm formed a part. Plaintiff sued for damages to his crops by wild pheasants, 450 of which the
defendant had placed as game stock in a thicket adjoining the plaintiff's farm. The defendant answered that he was a reasonable user of
the land, and since the birds lived and propagated naturally on the land,
being ferae naturae, their trespass could not be imputed to the defendant, citing to the court Boulston v. Hardy. Pollack B. chose not to
follow the Boulston case, holding that, "It is not merely the case of a
man collecting noxious animals upon his land so as to injure his neighbor, but the case of a man entitled to keep game upon the land, and
the tenant complaining of injury to his crops from this game being
unduly multiplied. . . . [The] moment he brings on game to an unreasonable amount or causes it to increase to an unreasonable extent,
he is doing that which is unlawful. . .. "I'
The English court in Bland v. Yates,' 2 allowed an injunction to the
plaintiff who occupied a dwelling house next to the defendant's market
garden, an enterprise common to the community but where was heaped
a large amount of manure which attracted flies to the annoyance of
the plaintiff. The court restrained the defendant from maintaining
the supply of manure which it found he was keeping in amounts excess
for that locality.
A different result was reached in the relatively recent case of
Steam v. Prentice Bros., Ltd.,13 where the plaintiff was suing for
damages to his crops from rats which passed back and forth between
his fields and a fertilizer factory where the defendant stored large
heaps of animal bones. The court distinguished the Bland case on the
theory that the lower court had not found that the amount of bones
stored had been excessive. It denied recovery to the plaintiff holding
that the Boulston case was controlling on the point, and by way of
analysis of the equities involved, stated that, "Bone manure manufactories have existed for a very great number of years. Bones are a
natural and valuable waste product. . . . Rats have been the enemies
of farmers ever since land was cultivated. If proper measures are not
taken by occupiers of land to destroy them they quickly increase. They
are ferae naturae."1 4 The industry-minded court was evidently impressed by the plaintiff's failure to prove that the rats were increasing
-o
15 Q. B. D. 258 (1885).
1
'11d.
58 at
Sol.260.
J. 612 (1914).

13 [1919] 1 K. B. 394.

14 Id. at 396.
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because of anything done on the defendant's premises since his pile
of bones was no larger then than it had been for the past thirty years.
If there exists a definite field of liability for the depredations of
animals naturally on the land, some commentators 15 on the subject
tend to imply that the rationale used in the few decisions available lies
somewhere between the traditional law of nuisance and the doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher 6 Under either theory of recovery liability
attaches to certain conduct on the actor's own premises which results
in harm to the property rights of an adjoining landowner. The Rylands case could not be decided on the grounds of ordinary trespass
since the damage to the plaintiff's land was neither intentional nor
direct. It didn't seem to fit the orthodox pattern of private nuisance
since it was more than a mere noxious interference with the enjoyment
of land, but yet was not continuous nor recurring so that the defendant
was put on noticem
The Restatement of Torts limits the Rylands
doctrine to ultrahazardous activity and allowing liability without consideration of fault for the "non-natural" use of land which "necessarily
involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others
which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care."' 8 A
kindred type of liability without regard to the degree of care used applies to the keeping of wild and ferocious animals.' 9
Private nuisance, on the other hand, had been defined merely as
the "unreasonable interference with the interest of an individual in the
use or enjoyment of land. Such a nuisance requires substantial harm,
as distinguished from a trespass, which may consist of a mere technical invasion."' °
Professor Prosser in discussing the apparent blending of the two
theories comes up with a solution which seems to fit our present case:
"There are relatively few situations in which it makes very much difference which basis of liability is to be relied on. For this reason, and
because the action on the case for nuisance was adequate to cover any
of three [i. e. theories of recovery based on intentional invasion, negligence, and strict liability], the courts seldom have made the distinction, and have been content to say merely that a nuisance, exists. Another
reason for this has been the fact that the great majority of nuisance
suits have been in equity, and concerned primarily with the prevention
of future damages. Under such circumstances the original nature of
"Noel, Nuisance From Land in Its Natural Condition, 56 HARV. L. REv. 772
(1943). Notes, 19 CoLum. L. REv. 251 (1919); 18 MicH. L. REv. 70 (1919);
cf. 16
23 CALiF. L. REv. 427, 433 (1935).
L. R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
lPROSSER,
TORTS § 59 (2d ed. 1955).
18
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 519 (1938).
"PROSSER,
TORTS § 57 (2d ed. 1955).
20Id. §70 at
p. 389.
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the defendant's conduct frequently loses its importance, since his persistence, over the plaintiff's protest, in continuing conduct which may
have been merely negligent or abnormal in its inception, is sufficient to
establish its character as an intentional wrong. ''21
Breaking down the elements involved in the present North Carolina decision, it would be fair to conclude that by a general application
of facts to theory, the defendant's conduct, as alleged by the plaintiff,
in unreasonably using a pond on his own land, has interfered with the
plaintiff's enjoyment of the plaintiff's land. Defendant's purposes evidence no great social or economic utility which would outweigh the
value of plaintiff's farming enterprise, and he had been placed on notice
of the damage caused by his conduct but yet refused to abate the
nuisance even though the expense or effort required on his part would
be nominal. The remaining question, however, is whether as a matter
of law holding the defendant liable for the trespasses of wild geese,
living free from the control, possession or restraint of the defendant,
is so fundamentally a violation of personal freedom to enjoy one's own
land as in all justice to require a finding for the defendant.
In addition to the conflicting English decisions on point, and one
American case following the Farrer lead, 22 there have been a number
of cases holding liability for private nuisance against landowners for
maintaining stagnant ponds which breed malarial mosquitoes.23 This
would certainly seem to demonstrate that no ironclad rule governs
24
liability for animals ferae naturae.
The dissenting opinion of the principal case in citing Sickman v.
United States2 is weakened by the fact that that case was brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act on the theory that the United States had
ownership rights in the wild geese and was negligent, through its employees and agents, in allowing its animals to trespass on the plaintiffs'
land, destroying their crops. It is doubtful whether either the American
or English authorities would find an employer liable for injuries by
a wild animal on a theory that his employees were negligent in allowing wildbirds to fly on plaintiffs' land, when the birds had never been
reduced to possession or control in the defendant's game preserve,
" PROSsER, TORTS § 70, p. 393 (2d ed. 1955).

22Taylor v. Granger, 19 R. I. 410, 34 Atl. 153 (1896), where the court said
of an action for negligently permitting pigeons to disturb the plaintiff's premises,
that though the cause of action on the case was the proper remedy, the principle
really embodied in the facts was based on nuisance; Sic utere tuo ut alicnns
non2 laedus.
Yaffe v. City of Fort Smith, 178 Ark. 406, 10 S. W. 886, 61 A. L. R. 1138
(1928) ; Towaliga Falls Power Co. v. Sims, 6 Ga. App. 649, 65 S. E. 844 (1909);
Mills v. Hall, 9 Wend. 315, 24 Am. Dec. 160 (N. Y. 1832).
24 For a general criticism of the judicial use of the term ferae naturae, see
Beven, The Responsibility at Common Law for the Keeping of Animals, 22
HARv. L. REv. 465 (1909).
25184 F. 2d 616 (1950), cert. denied 341 U. S. 939 (1951).
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established pursuant to statute. A possible alternative theory might
have been based on a taking or partial confiscation of the plaintiffs'
property without just compensation with suit brought instead in the
U. S. Court of Claims.2
The North Carolina decision can be supported as a proper and just
one in view of both the historical development of the rights of landowners and the current interpretations and conclusions reached by
students of that "impenetrable jungle" of the law called nuisance.
ROBERT

B.

MILLMAN, JR.

Wills and Contracts-Degree of Mental Capacity Requisite for Each
The problem of whether the degree of mental capacity necessary
for making a valid will is in any way related to or measurable by that
degree of mental capacity requisite to entering into a valid contractual
obligation has been the source of frequent disagreement among courts.
In North Carolina, as in most jurisdictions, a person is in law deemed
to have sufficient mental capacity to make a will when he has a clear
understanding of the nature and extent of his act, the kind and value
of the property devised, the persons who are the natural objects of
his bounty, and the manner in which he desires to dispose of it.' The
problem is in determining when these requirements are met. Courts'
have repeatedly attempted to compare contractual capacity with testamentary capacity, and for the most part the result has been unsatisfactory.
It has been said that a lesser degree of mental capacity is required
for a will than for the execution of a valid contract or the transaction
of ordinary business. 2 In an Illinois case,3 the testatrix had been adjudged incapable of managing her business affairs and a conservator
was appointed one month before the execution of her will. The court
held that this was not enough to invalidate a will,4 stating:
"Mental strength to compete with an antagonist and understanding to protect his own interest are essential in the transaction of
ordinary business, while it is sufficient for the making of a will
that the testator understands the business in which he is engaged, his property, the natural objects of his bounty, and the
disposition he desires to make of his property."5
11 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946); U. S.

CONST.

amend. V.
'Inre Will of Brown, 194 N. C. 583, 140 S. E. 192 (1927).
'Converse v. Converse, 2 Vt. 168 (1849).
'In re Weedman's Estate, 254 I1. 504, 98 N. E. 956 (1912).
'86 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 14 (1874) provides that an inquest of lunacy once proven
will void subsequent contracts.
in regard to wills.

It is significant that no such declaration is made

' In re Weedman's Estate. 254 Ill.
504. 508, 98 N. E. 956, 957 (1912). See also:
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It has also been held in Illinois that the mental capacity required for
making a will is less than that which is required for making a deed.0
A number of other courts have held that less mental faculty is re7
required for making a will than for executing any other instrument.
A recent Georgia case, holding that the capacity required to contract is
greater, declared: "The weak have the same rights as the strong to
dispose of their property by will, and anything less than a total absence
of mind will not destroy that capacity." s
North Carolina recognizes the same standard of mental capacity
for testing the validity of both deeds and wills, although it has been
suggested that, perhaps, the court would scrutinize a deed more closely.0
In an Alabama case1 0 the court held that the same degree of mental
capacity is required to make a will as is requisite to entering into a
valid contract, that there is no middle ground, and that both must stand
as to the question of capacity on precisely the same footing. A Maryland statute in its definition of testamentary capacity adds to the usual
"sound and disposing mind and memory" clause the requirement that
one must be capable of making a valid deed or contract."
A few courts seem to be of the opinion that the mental capacity
should be greater for making a will. In Aubert v.Augert' 2 a Louisiana court stated:
"Testaments are more easily avoided than contracts on the
ground of unsoundness of mind .... The difference has its source

in the consideration that laws regulating the capacity to contract are in furtherance of the natural rights of man, and that
all restraints upon that capacity are abridgements of his liberty.
. . .Society cannot exist without the capacity to contract, but
the power to dispose of property by will is not necessary to its
well being."
King v. Lawless, 190 Ill.
520, 60 N. E. 881 (1901); Greene v. Maxwell, 251 IIl.
(1911).
335, 6 N. E. 227, 36 L.
R. A.298,
(N. 65S.)N.418
E. 713 (1902).
' Waugh v. Moan, 200 Ill.
'I1t re Moyer's Will, 97 Misc. Rep. 512, 163 N. Y. S. 296 (Surr. Ct. 1916);
see also, It re Barney's Will, 187 Mich. 157, 153 N. W. 730 (1915), declaring
that it is elementary that less mental capacity is required to make a will than
to make a contract.
' Beman et al. v. Stembridge, 211 Ga. 274, 85 S. E. 2d 434, 440 (1955).
' Gilliken v. Norcom, 197 N. C. 8, 147 S. E. 433 (1929); In McDevitt v.
Chandler, 241 N. C. 677, 86 S. E. 2d 438 (1955) the court declared that in order
to execute a valid deed, the grantor must have sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his act, what he is disposing of, and to whom.
"0McElroy v. McElroy, 5 Ala. 81 (1843); see also Coleman v. Robertson's
Ex'rs., 17 Ala. 84 (1849), stating that the capacity to make a valid will or contract is precisely the same.
" Applied in Lyon v. Townsend, 124 Md. 163, 91 A. 704 (1914); Davis v.
Calvert, 5 Gill & J.269, 25 Am. Dec. 282 (1833).
"26 La. Ann. 104, 106 (1851).
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The logical inference from this divergence of judicial opinion is
that the two are so different in their nature that they cannot be compared. This is the view which has been taken by the majority of the
courts. In determining the capacity of a person to execute a will,
attention should be given to the character of the instrument.' 8 It
seems quite possible that one may lack the capacity to transact complicated, 14 important,' 5 or ordinary business' 6 and still be capable of making a simple disposition of his property by will. Conversely, it would
seem than one may have contractual capacity and yet lack testamentary
capacity.' 7 However, it is generally held that, in the absence of an
insane delusion, one who has contractual capacity has the capacity to
make a will.' 8

In Murphy v. Nett"9 the court refused to charge the jury that a
"less degree of mind" is required to execute a will than a contract,
saying:
".. . [W]e think in such matters comparisons are odious and

for purposes of instructing the jury wholly unnecessary. To
make a will implies more than merely signing it, and it contravenes human experience to say that the conception, ordering,
and comprehension of a will dispensing, with care and precision,
extensive property, involving, it may be, charities and trusts of
various kinds, requires less capacity than the purchase of a bar
of soap; or that the same intellectual capacity is required for the
simple holograph 'I leave all of my property to my wife' and for
the elaboration of a complex trade agreement designed to accomplish far reaching results. The conclusion of common sense is
that it takes more mind to make some wills than to make some
contracts, and vice versa. ....,,20
A South Carolina decision,21 however, held that where testamentary
capacity was otherwise correctly defined and the court added that it
required less mental capacity to execute a will than a contract, it was
not sufficiently prejudicial to be reversible error.
"' In re Weber's Estate, 201 Mich. 447, 167 N. W. 937 (1918).
Barnhill v. Miller, 114 Kan. 73, 217 Pac. 274 (1923).
15 Neimes v. Neimes, 97 Ohio St 145, 119 N. E. 503 (1917).
'Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 125 N. W. 664 (1910).
7American Bible Society v. Price, 115 Ill. 623, 5 N. E. 126 (1886).
" itre Wax's Estate, 106 Cal. 343, 39 Pac. 624 (1895).
1047 Mont. 38, 57, 130 Pac. 451, 455 (1913).
0 See also: Turner's Appeal, 72 Conn. 305, 44 A. 310 (1899); Brown v.
Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350, 31 S. W. 621, 36 L. R. A. 64 (1895); Segur's Will, 71
Vt. 224, 44 A. 342 (1898) ; Greene v. Greene, 145 Ill.
264, 33 N. E. 941 (1893),
holding that while contractual capacity implies prima facie the capacity to make
a will, yet neither is a test for the other and the presence or absence of one does
not conclusively establish the presence or absence of the other.
" Goble v. Rauch, 50 S.C. 95, 27 S. E. 555 (1897).
14
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While the great weight of authority is against the comparison of
business capacity and testamentary capacity, the courts have by no
means been unanimous in so holding. It seems that some courts have
altered standards set by their own previous decisions. A Missouri
court

once decided that a person may have testamentary capacity

even though he cannot transact complicated business, and in a later
case held that it was proper to instruct the jury that a person had
testamentary capacity if he had sufficient understanding to transact
business affairs.
LEwis H.
"'Rose v. Rose, 249 S. W. 605 (Mo. 1923).

PARHAM, JR.

" Rex v. Masonic Home of Missouri, 341 Mo. 589, 108 S. W. 2d 897 (1937).

